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DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE: WHO WILL STAND UP 
FOR SOFTWARE PATENTS AFTER ALICE? 
Daniel Taylor* 
ABSTRACT 
  In June 2014, the Supreme Court changed patent law completely when it issued 
a decision in Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International.  In one fell swoop, the 
Court cast doubt on the validity and enforceability of hundreds of thousands of 
issued software and technology patents.  Since the Alice decision, federal district 
courts have applied the Alice test and have already invalidated more than one 
hundred software patents as a matter of law.  This Comment discusses why the Alice 
decision expands the judicial doctrine of creating “exceptions” to the Patent Act, 
and shifts the statutory factual inquiry of “obviousness” into a legal inquiry that 
enables courts to invalidate patents as a matter of law in pretrial motions.  Given the 
role of software in our economy, Alice places billions of dollars of technology 
products and services in peril and threatens future investment in American 
technology companies.  In light of Alice, this Comment asks when technology 
companies will begin lobbying Congress to reaffirm the Patent Act and to legislate 
to overcome the wrong-headed thinking of Alice. 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology has become an integral part of the U.S. economy to the point where 
few could imagine a world without mobile devices, software, and the Internet.  The 
technology industry has long relied on a system of intellectual property for protecting 
innovation and investment—patents, copyrights, and trademarks underlie the 
business model for making and selling technology products, services, and even 
media.  In 2014, U.S. companies invested $313 billion1 in developing software to 
support their businesses, and, to protect that investment, the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office issued 68,374 software-related patents2 that claimed innovations 
in a variety of technologies, ranging from semiconductors and relational databases 
                                                                                                     
 *  J.D., magna cum laude (2015) University of Maine School of Law, B.S. Engineering Mechanics 
(1991) Johns Hopkins University. With thanks to Professor Christine Davik, Joseph Gousse and patent 
attorneys in the University of Maine community, including Adjunct Professor Erik Heels (J.D., 1995) and 
Steven Saunders (J.D., 1992). 
 1.  National Data, Table 5.6.5. Private Fixed Investment in Intellectual Property Products by Type, 
U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm (interactive table; follow 
“Begin using the data” button) (last visited Aug. 27, 2015) (demonstrating that, in 2013 U.S. companies 
invested 45.5%, or $295 billion, of their annual IP investments in software, compared to 32.5% for IP 
investments in manufacturing).  According to the data set available for download, in 1970, U.S. companies 
invested five dollars in manufacturing technologies for every dollar investment in software.  Id. (file 
available for download; click on “download” button to view data from 1970 onward). 
 2.  Patent Technology Monitoring Team, EXTENDED YEAR SET - Patenting By Geographic 
Region (State and Country), Breakout By Technology Class Count of 1963 - 2014 Utility Patent Grants, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/stcteca/ 
allstcl_gd.htm (classes 345, 348, 369–70, 375, 379–80, 382–86, 455, 700–26) (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
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to distributed software and Internet applications delivered to mobile devices.3 
The original Patent Act was drafted in 1790 and required for patents to be 
examined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General.4  
For obvious reasons, this was an untenable approach, and it was replaced in 1793 
with a registration system.5  In 1836, Congress passed the first modern patent 
statute,6 which created the Patent Office, established a system of patent examination, 
and introduced the requirement of a written description7 complete with patent 
claims.8  Congress enacted a number of changes to the statute in 18709 and performed 
a full overhaul to create the modern statute in 1952.10  Within the Patent Act, the role 
of section 101 is to define patent eligibility: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title.” 11  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has asserted that it 
has “long held that [section 101] contains an important implicit exception: Laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”12 
Over the past fifty years, as software has become integral to the U.S. economy, 
inventors and companies have invested more and more money to develop software.  
Along with these technology developments, companies have invested in patents to 
protect software innovations.  As these software innovations have become important 
to the financial success of technology-based companies, there has been a 
corresponding increase in litigation over software patents.  With each new lawsuit, 
courts frequently revisit the question of whether software is patent-eligible under 
section 101’s categories or if the “abstract idea” exception to patent protection 
applies.13  The Supreme Court first answered this question in the negative in 1972 
when it decided Gottschalk v. Benson.14  In that case, the United States Patent & 
Trademark Office (USPTO) had denied a patent application for an algorithm for 
translating binary coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers on a computer—
                                                                                                     
 3.  See US Classes by Number with Title Menu, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/selectnumwithtitle.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2015) 
(linking to definitions for individual U.S. patent classifications). 
 4.  See The First United States Patent Statute. Sec. 1., ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (April 10, 1790) (repealed 
1793). 
 5.  See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-23 (February 21, 1793) (repealed 1836). 
 6.  See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836) (amended 1870). 
 7.  Id. at Sec. 6 (“[An inventor] shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and 
of the manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, clear, 
and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to 
which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the 
same[.]”). 
 8.  Id. (“[The written description] shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or 
combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.”). 
 9.  See generally Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (July 8, 1870). 
 10.  See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (July 19, 1952). 
 11.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 12.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) 
[hereinafter Myriad] (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For reasons to be discussed, 
the Court’s basis for these “judicial exceptions” is shaky at best.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 13.  See discussion infra Part I.E. 
 14.  409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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the Court agreed with the USPTO and rejected the patent application as claiming a 
process that was “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown 
uses[.]”15 
In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on a 1966 report16 from 
President Johnson’s Commission on the Patent System that had recommended that 
software should not be patented.17  At the time, the Court suggested: 
If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which only 
committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed, 
including hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating 
in this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in the many briefs before 
us indicate to us that considered action by the Congress is needed.18 
This nominal deference left the door open for Congress to amend the Patent Act to 
make explicit that software could not be patented.  However, the Court’s actions in 
invalidating the software patent were premature because Congress never changed the 
statute, and software remained patent eligible under section 101.  At the same time, 
Benson created common law precedent that contradicted the Patent Act, solidified 
the “abstract idea” judicial exception, and forced subsequent decisions to embrace, 
explain, and extend judicial activism.19  Over the next forty years, three subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions addressed the question of the patentability of software,20 
though the question was more directly addressed in the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit21—the same court which, in 1982, had been granted primary 
appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases.22  During the “dotcom” boom of the late 
1990s, Federal Circuit precedent encouraged broad software patenting under a liberal 
standard that simply required claimed inventions to produce a “useful, concrete, and 
                                                                                                     
 15.  Id. at 68. 
 16.  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL 
ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY, S. Doc. No. 90-5, at 20-21 (1967). 
 17.  Id. at 20 (“A series of instructions which control or condition the operation of a data processing 
machine, generally referred to as a ‘program,’ shall not be considered patentable regardless of whether 
the program is claimed as: (a) an article, (b) a process described in terms of the operations performed by 
a machine pursuant to a program, or (c) one or more machine configurations established by a program.”).  
While Congress did not adopt the recommendations, the Commission claimed that section 101 was unclear 
on whether software was patentable and explained, with absolutely no sense of irony, about the role of 
computing and software in performing the precise task, that “[t]he Patent Office now cannot examine 
applications for programs because of the lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files.”  
Id. at 21. 
 18.  Benson, 409 U.S. at 73 (footnotes omitted). 
 19.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-02 (2010) (discussing the judicial exceptions as 
long-settled “statutory stare decisis going back 150 years”). 
 20.  See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593 (holding invalid under section 101 a patent application for an 
economic hedging algorithm); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1982) (upholding application of 
mathematical formula to curing rubber); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (upholding an examiner 
rejection of an algorithm for updating alarm limits). 
 21.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
[hereinafter State Street]; In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 22.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012). 
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tangible result.”23 
By 2013, American companies had invested heavily in software innovations24 
and nearly a quarter of U.S. patents issued that year were for software-related 
inventions.25  Also, software patents were the source of enough litigation that the 
term “patent troll” had entered the American vernacular. 26  Generally speaking, the 
American public had developed a negative opinion of trolls and their patent assertion 
strategies.27 
The following year, the Supreme Court again heard arguments about the patent 
eligibility of software inventions.  This time, far more was at stake in Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l.28  
One could imagine the meetings that were happening throughout 2014 in the 
boardrooms of technology companies.  One after the next corporate counsel 
explained to management that things were uncertain—a single Supreme Court 
decision could wipe out billions of dollars in software patents that protect hundreds 
of billions of dollars in economic output.29 
Imagine the collective sigh of relief that everyone breathed when it became clear 
in the Alice decision that the Court would not eliminate software patenting 
altogether.30  Imagine further the horror that then ensued as judges across the country 
                                                                                                     
 23.  State Street, 139 F.3d at 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (en banc)) (“[T]he transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine 
through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of 
a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible 
result[.]’”). 
 24.  See supra note 1. 
 25.  See supra note 2. 
 26.  See 496: When Patents Attack...Part Two!, THIS AM. LIFE (May 31, 2013), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/496/when-patents-attack-part-two; 441: When 
Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE (Jul. 22, 2011), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/ 
441/when-patents-attack. 
 27.  A common criticism of “patent trolls” is that the companies do not make products and simply 
assert their patent rights. This is a requirement not found in the Patent Act. Issued patents are “presumed 
valid,” 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012), and patent owners have “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling [an] invention throughout the United States,” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994). 
 28.  134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 29.  See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) [hereinafter CLS Bank] 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (“[T]his case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business 
method, financial system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented and 
telecommunications patents.”). See also Examining Recent Supreme Court Cases In The Patent Arena: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of Herbert C. Wamsley, Exec. Dir., Intellectual Prop. Owners 
Ass’n) (“It will take a while to determine the impact of Alice. The long-term effect will depend on how 
the lower courts, particularly the Federal Circuit, interpret and apply Alice. Courts have had problems for 
years with consistency and predictability in making determinations about patent eligibility. The lack of 
clarity in Alice makes it more difficult for innovators to determine when it is appropriate to invest in 
patent protection, and casts the shadow of uncertainty on all patents, even good ones.”). 
 30.  David J. Kappos, Symposium: Supreme Court leaves patent protection for software innovation 
intact, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 20, 2014 4:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-
supreme-court-leaves-patent-protection-for-software-innovation-intact/ (“From the perspective of the 
parties involved, this week’s Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank decision held that a process that lessens settlement 
risk for trades of financial instruments is too abstract for patenting. However, to the leagues of interested 
onlookers holding their collective breath across our country and indeed around the world, the Supreme 
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became de facto patent examiners, applying the rule articulated in Alice to invalidate 
issued U.S. patents as a matter of law on motions to dismiss, on motions on the 
pleadings, and at summary judgment.31  
Within the first ten months after the Alice decision, U.S. courts had invalidated 
3,026 claims in 117 U.S. patents in pretrial motions.32  By comparison, this 
represents more patents than those same courts had invalidated in the previous five 
years—often after detailed factual and legal inquiries.33 
On one hand, the Court’s test in Alice is a sensible approach to resolving a long-
simmering dispute about the patent eligibility of software and business methods 
under section 101 of the Patent Act.34  One could argue that the Supreme Court was 
simply cleaning up a mess that had been festering for years at the Federal Circuit, 
where an en banc court had failed to reach meaningful consensus on the issue of 
Alice’s patents.35  This has been part of the Supreme Court’s increased involvement 
in intellectual property,36 and it was a definitive stand to provide clarity and 
predictability while maintaining consistency with the Court’s earlier decisions.  On 
the other hand, Alice’s “abstractness” test37 is extremely subjective, and the lack of 
clarity at the Federal Circuit could be the result of the Supreme Court’s deferential 
intervention in section 101 as far back as 1972 in Benson.38  It was arguably a mistake 
for the Court to get involved in crafting exceptions to section 101, especially when 
there are numerous examples of the Court staying out of the affairs of Congress, even 
in relation to the Patent Act.39 
Either way, federal courts are now in the business of questioning the validity of 
issued U.S. patents—as a matter of law—based upon a body of case law developed 
by the Supreme Court.  This case law articulates three judicially-defined 
“exceptions” to the four categories of invention as defined by Congress in section 
101 of the Patent Act. 
Judging from its effects, the Alice decision will ultimately stand for a number of 
                                                                                                     
Court’s unanimous ruling subtly conveyed a much more significant judgment: software, as a class, is 
every bit as worthy of patent protection as any other medium in which innovation can be practiced.”). 
 31.  See Robert R. Sachs, Twenty-Two Ways Congress Can Save Section 101, BILSKIBLOG (Feb. 12, 
2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/02/twenty-two-ways-congress-can-save-section-101.html. 
 32.  See Robert R. Sachs, Tracking #ALICESTORM: The Dead Keep Piling Up, BILSKIBLOG (Apr. 
10, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/04/alicestorm-update.html. 
 33.  Sachs, supra note 31. 
 34.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 35.  CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
 36.  See, e.g., Key Patent Law Decisions of 2014, JONES DAY (Mar. 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/ 
files/upload/Key_Patent_Law_Decisions_of_2014.pdf  (“[T]he Supreme Court is on pace to double the 
number of patent law decisions issued in any previous decade.”). 
 37.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 38.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 39.  See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (“Plausible arguments can be 
made for and against extending § 271(f) to the conduct charged in this case as infringing AT&T’s patent. 
Recognizing that § 271(f) is an exception to the general rule that our patent law does not apply 
extraterritorially, we resist giving the language in which Congress cast § 271(f) an expansive 
interpretation. Our decision leaves to Congress’ informed judgment any adjustment of § 271(f) it deems 
necessary or proper.”); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (“[W]e find 
the Fifth Circuit’s definition unacceptable because it collides head on with a line of decisions so firmly 
embedded in our patent law as to be unassailable absent a congressional recasting of the statute.”). 
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economic, legal, and policy premises.  Economically, Alice raises doubts about the 
future of technology companies and their investments in the U.S. economy.  With 
patent protection for software and biotechnology in doubt, the economic question is 
whether companies will continue to invest in those areas or if they will shift their 
activities to other technologies or other regions of the world.40  
This Comment will argue that, legally, Alice represents a form of judicial 
activism, explained under the guise of stare decisis,41 in which the Supreme Court 
continues to craft legal doctrine in addition to the statutory text of the Patent Act42 
and without deference to the acting administrative agency, the USPTO.  
The Court’s unanimous voice and its unquestioning assessment of text lifted 
from nineteenth and twentieth Century cases is a poor reading of patent law that 
misunderstands the role of section 101 and the interplay between patent eligibility 
and patentability as defined in key sections of the Patent Act.  For example, in Alice 
the Court’s search for an “inventive concept” in a patent claim is broadly equivalent 
to the “flash of genius” requirement of invention that Congress specifically 
overturned when it created the new requirement of nonobviousness in section 103 of 
the 1952 Act. 
Furthermore, as a policy implement, Alice is a cudgel and not a scalpel—it is a 
crude tool that will quickly eliminate a large number of software patents.  Initially, 
technology companies will appreciate the work Alice will do in quickly removing 
poor quality, broadly claimed software patents from Article III litigation.  Once that 
has happened, litigants will turn the Alice test in the direction of more valuable assets 
that protect product lines with ongoing revenues.  As this happens, technology 
companies will face a moment of truth, and either the Supreme Court will have to 
unwind Alice, or technology-based industries will ultimately have to fight Alice in 
the courts or in Congress.  
In addressing this outcome, this Comment poses three questions: (1) who will 
be inspired to act in response to the forthcoming mass invalidation of software 
patents as well as patents in other fields of endeavor; (2) why are technology 
companies acting as if Alice is business as usual;43 and (3) when will the tide turn 
                                                                                                     
 40.  See, e.g., David J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, The Great Patent Debate: 
Changing Horizons, Address at Intellectual Asset Management (IPBC/Global) Meeting the NPE 
Challenge (Mar. 13, 2015), available at http://www.iam-media.com/files/Kappos%20speech.pdf (“Make 
no mistake: if America denies robust protection to software innovations, decreased investment will 
inevitably follow—eroding a competitive advantage in a sector that has proven vital to the United States 
economy. Again, to the benefit of overseas competitors who would like nothing better than an open ticket 
to copy U.S. software innovation.”). 
 41.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-02 (2010) (citations omitted) (“The Court’s precedents 
provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles . . . . these exceptions have 
defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”). 
 42.  Id. (“While these exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the 
notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’”). The Court acknowledges that nothing in the 
statute suggests these exceptions, though, here in Bilski, the Court suggests that the novelty and utility 
requirements seem to imply the exceptions—an argument that is weak at best. Id.; contra cases cited supra 
note 39. 
 43.  See Examining Recent Supreme Court Cases In The Patent Arena, supra note 29 (“We conclude 
that it is too early to tell what long-term effect Alice will have on deterring or decreasing abusive behaviors 
in patent litigation. Alice was decided only months ago. Reports suggest a significant increase in district 
courts invalidating patents on software-related inventions as lacking eligible subject matter. However, 
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against Alice? 
In the right circumstance, the Supreme Court could address or limit Alice, but 
that is highly unlikely given that it was a unanimous decision.  Of the other potential 
actors, technology companies are in prime position to lobby Congress for meaningful 
reform on section 101 that will provide a clear avenue for software patenting now 
and into the future.  However, technology companies have been unwilling to tackle 
the issue of software patents for several reasons.  First, the public perception that 
software patents are valueless and that only patent trolls assert them makes a public 
battle over software patent legislation a costly affair in Congress—both in terms of 
money and in political capital—even though America’s largest technology 
companies—including IBM, Google, Microsoft, and Apple—together apply for 
thousands of software patents each year.44  Second, many technology companies 
have diversified their product portfolios to reduce their dependence on software 
profit margins and to instead, as in the case of Apple, generate those margins by 
linking between product lines and services.  Third, most technology companies 
pursue cross licensing agreements to protect product lines and entire lines of 
business.  If Alice leads to large-scale invalidation of large numbers of software 
patents, then technology companies could be waiting to see if the impacts are 
distributed evenly across technology companies or if they disproportionately impact 
some companies and not others.  For each of these reasons, there is little cost for 
technology companies to wait and see what happens in the aftermath of Alice. 
Of course, the impacts of Alice will cascade across the technology industry when 
companies will no longer be able to prevent other companies from directly copying 
their technologies and competing with them.  This is the inevitable groundswell of 
Alice. 
This Comment will first discuss, in Part I.C, the scope, scale, and economic 
impact of software patents.  Part I.D is a primer on patent law terms as it relates to 
software patents, and it includes a discussion of the particular challenges facing 
software patents.  Part II outlines the procedural differences between modern section 
101 cases before and after Mayo, culminating in a discussion of the Alice decision in 
Part II.A, measurable impacts of Alice in Part II.B, and legal implications of Alice in 
Part II.C.  Finally, in Part III, this Comment will discuss why Alice is the product of 
the technology industry and why technology companies must ultimately take 
responsibility for unwinding Alice through Congressional action. 
I.  SOFTWARE PATENTS IN CONTEXT 
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress control over intellectual property: 
“[t]he Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries . . . .”45  This exclusive patent right is a monopoly 
which enables a patent owner to prevent others from making, using, offering for sale, 
                                                                                                     
there is too little data to say whether this is a trend or a temporary spike. Some say reports of the death of 
software patents have been greatly exaggerated.”). 
 44.  See infra Figure 4. 
 45.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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or selling any patented invention.46  As property, a patent consists of the right to 
exclude others.47  “It is, in effect, a bundle of rights which may be divided and 
assigned, or retained in whole or part.”48  The patent grant is also territorial in nature 
and is focused on acts performed in the United States.49  However, at its core, the 
Patent Act is a system of disclosure, in which an inventor demonstrates to the public 
how to make and use an invention in return for limited monopoly protection.50  An 
issued patent is a legal document that is presumed valid51 in court and that provides 
notice to other inventors, technologists, and product developers in a given industry.52 
To understand the scope of software patents, one only need to visit a website—
something as simple as the Google homepage.  Sitting behind that single web page 
and its innocent-looking search box is millions (if not billions) of lines of software 
code, embodying billions of dollars of research and development.53  This innovation 
is captured in thousands of patents for search engine technologies, Internet 
advertising, distributed computing, databases, graphical user interfaces, and so forth.  
In this context, the patent right enables companies such as Apple, Google, IBM, and 
Microsoft to prevent competitors from copying. 
However, in order to prevent others from copying, the patent right requires a 
patent owner to file suit in federal district court.54  Once a patent owner has filed suit 
against an alleged infringer, the defendant has the right to assert a series of defenses 
which include (1) that the asserted patent is invalid; and (2) that the defendant is not 
infringing.55  The first defense—patent invalidity—is particularly concerning in 
relation to software inventions, because software is ultimately a process or a method, 
and a key argument against the validity of process inventions is to assert that the 
process is simply an “abstract idea” and is therefore not patentable.56  A key 
challenge for software is that inventions can be articulated as processes, machines, 
or even products, but the validity of a patent based upon the invention hinges on 
whether the underlying process is an abstract idea.  In this, we say that the claims 
“rise or fall together,” specifically, the patent claims rise and fall with the underlying 
                                                                                                     
 46.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1952) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 47.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994) (“Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant 
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 
or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, 
and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling 
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process, referring 
to the specification for the particulars thereof.”). 
 48.  Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 49.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (defining the scope of patent 
infringement as within the United States). 
 50.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). See also Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 625 (2010) (detailing the disclosure requirement). 
 51.  35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (presumption of validity). 
 52.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 53.  See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 54.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 55.  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
 56.  See discussion infra Part I.E. 
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process.57  As we see in the Alice decision, processes as articulated in software 
inventions are particularly vulnerable to subjective challenge under section 101 of 
the Patent Act. 
A.  1952 Patent Act 
Opponents to software patents often assert that software patents are overly broad 
and that there is no invention to be found in much of software.58  Since this Comment 
discusses the Patent Act, it is helpful to understand the modern patent statute, how it 
eliminated the requirement of “invention,” and how the requirements of the statute 
work together.  The 1952 Patent Act made a major change to the way patent law 
worked by eliminating the common law test of “invention” and replacing it with 
section 103, which created a statutory test for “obviousness.”59 
During the Nineteenth Century, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,60 the Supreme 
Court developed the common law principle of inventiveness.61  By the middle of the 
Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court had begun to expand the principle of 
inventiveness, in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,62 to include 
an altogether new and different requirement of genius: “the new device, however 
useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the 
calling.”63 
Courts applied variations of the so-called “flash of genius” test in a series of 
cases throughout the 1940s.64  In 1943, the National Patent Planning Commission 
observed that the patent system was plagued by “the lack of a definitive yardstick as 
to what is invention.”65  The Commission proposed that the “patentability of an 
invention sh[ould] be determined by the objective test as to its advancement of the 
arts and sciences.”66 
By the end of that decade, some on the Supreme Court were circumspect about 
the role of the Court in invalidating patents.  In a dissent in Jungersen v. Ostby & 
Barton Co.,67 Justice Jackson wrote, “I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office 
passion for granting patents [that it should not have] is an equally strong passion in 
this Court for striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is one which 
this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”68  
                                                                                                     
 57.  See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, J, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 58.  See infra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 59.  See infra note 70. 
 60.  52 U.S. 248 (1851). 
 61.  See id. at 265 (invalidating a patent for attaching porcelain doorknobs because “no more 
ingenuity or skill [is] required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary 
mechanic acquainted with the business”). 
 62.  314 U.S. 84 (1941). 
 63.  Id. at 90-91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 64.  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Halliburton Oil 
Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 
U.S. 84 (1941). 
 65.  REPORT OF THE NAT’L PATENT PLANNING COMM’N, H.R. DOC. NO. 78-239, at 10 (1943). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  335 U.S. 560 (1949). 
 68.  Id. at 572 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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1.  Resolving “Invention” 
Congress had taken note of the controversy surrounding Cuno and the “flash of 
genius” test of invention and had incorporated the recommendations of the National 
Patent Planning Commission into a legislative process that involved patent attorneys, 
bar associations, and companies.69  According to the legislative history, the resulting 
section 10370 “paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the 
courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness.”71  The 
authors of the Act—P. J. Federico, Giles S. Rich, and Paul Rose72—make oblique 
reference to Cuno, but the purpose of section 103 is otherwise clear: “[t]his section 
should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared 
in some cases.”73  
Rich later clarified that the last sentence of section 10374 was written specifically 
to overturn Cuno.75 Furthermore, Rich has explained that he and the other drafters of 
section 103 sought to distance themselves from the inventiveness requirement and 
that “[t]he use of the term ‘invention’ was, in fact, carefully avoided with a view to 
making a fresh start, free of all the divergent court opinions and rhetorical 
pronouncements about ‘invention.’”76 
a.  Graham v. Deere 
In its 1966 Graham v. Deere77 decision, the Supreme Court definitively 
interpreted section 103: “[w]e have concluded that the 1952 Act was intended to 
codify judicial precedents . . . and that, while the clear language of § 103 places 
emphasis on an inquiry into obviousness, the general level of innovation necessary 
to sustain patentability remains the same.”78  This interpretation provided guidelines 
                                                                                                     
 69.  See generally Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before the 
Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Jud. Comm., 82nd Cong. 30 (1951) (statement of Henry R. Ashton, Chairman 
of Coordinating Committee, National Council of Patent Law Associations). 
 70.  1952 Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593. 66 Stat. 798 (“§ 103 Conditions for patentability; non-
obvious subject matter.  A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title if the difference between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time 
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.  
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”). 
 71.  S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 2393, 2400 (1952). 
 72.  See Patent Law Codification and Revision, supra note 69 (“It also seems appropriate to record 
here our thanks to the officers and members of the legislative committees of our associations and other 
individuals who have worked so diligently, and finally to thank Messrs. [P. J.] Federico, [Giles S.] Rich, 
and [Paul] Rose without whose untiring and invaluable help the work of the coordinating committee could 
not have been carried on.”). 
 73.  Patent Law Codification and Revision, supra note 69 (statement of P.J. Federico, Examiner-in-
Chief, United States Patent Office). 
 74.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention 
was made.”). 
 75.  Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 Patent 
Act, 46 J. PAT OFF. SOC’Y 855, 867 (1964). 
 76.  Id. at 864-65; id. at n.21. 
 77.  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 78.  Id. at 3-4. 
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for how courts79 and the USPTO80 have subsequently applied the principle of 
obviousness. 
2.  “Process” Replaces “Art” 
While section 103 is considered to be one of the major innovations81 of the 1952 
Act, the statute also made a minor change in defining patent-eligible subject matter 
in section 101.  Congress replaced art with process to avoid confusion with the 
constitutional phrase “the useful arts” and because “process” was the more modern 
term.82  In other words, although process was a natural choice in 1952, at the time 
Congress could not have known that six decades later process inventions—
implemented in software on computers—would become a major area of economic 
development, and that the intersection between processes and “invention” would 
become a hotly-contested area of patent law jurisprudence.83 
3.  The “Coarse Filter” of Section 101 
Until recently, section 101 was considered to be a “coarse filter” for evaluating 
the patent eligibility of the underlying subject matter of the invention—namely that 
patent claims must fit within the four statutory categories and those claims are then 
evaluated in terms of sections 101, 102, 103, and 112.84  As a “coarse filter,” section 
                                                                                                     
 79.  See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 80.  See generally 2141-58 MPEP (9th ed., Mar. 2014) (providing examination guidelines for section 
103). 
 81.  See S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 2393, 2397 (1952) (“The major changes or innovations in the title 
consist of incorporating a requirement for invention in sec. 103 and the judicial doctrine of contributory 
infringement in sec. 271.”). 
 82.  Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the 
H. Jud. Comm., 82nd Cong. 37 (1951) (statement of P. J. Federico, Examiner in Chief, United States 
Patent Office) (explaining the reasons why the drafters of section 101 had chosen “process” to replace 
“art”). 
 83.  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (invalidating a software patent 
for an exchange trading system, holding the claims to be directed to an abstract idea); Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (holding a scheme for computerized economic hedging to be an abstract idea 
and not patentable subject matter); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978) (upholding a patent 
examiner’s determination that the application of alarm limits in a manufacturing process was not 
patentable subject matter); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972) (upholding the denial of a 
method patent application claiming the conversion to and from binary numbers on a computer, because 
the algorithm was not a “process” for the purposes of section 101); contra Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 191-93 (1981) (overturning the denial of a method patent application claiming a process for curing 
rubber by applying the Arrhenius equation to be a patentable application of a mathematical formula and 
not an attempt to patent the equation itself). 
 84.  See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189-90 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)) (“It has 
been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101. Presumably, this argument results 
from the language in § 101 referring to any ‘new and useful’ process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, 
is a general statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection ‘subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.’ Specific conditions for patentability follow and § 102 covers in 
detail the conditions relating to novelty. The question therefore of whether a particular invention is novel 
is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.’”); Flook, 437 
U.S. at 593 (“[R]espondent incorrectly assumes that if a process application implements a principle in 
some specific fashion, it automatically falls within the patentable subject matter of § 101 and the 
substantive patentability of the particular process can then be determined by the conditions of §§ 102 and 
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101 has historically functioned in conjunction with section 112 as part of the “utility” 
requirement85 and not as the “fine-filter” gatekeeper that the Alice court suggests it 
should be.86 
P. J. Federico, a co-author of the 1952 Act, explained the interplay between 
section 101 and the rest of the Act in the following way: “[a] person may have 
‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun 
that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the 
conditions of the title are fulfilled.”87 The “conditions and requirements”88 of the 
Patent Act consist of four distinct criteria:89 
Novelty.  The requirement that an invention be “new” refers to the comparison 
between two identically similar inventions—if the inventions are not identical, then 
patent law does not compare them for novelty purposes.  Section 102 defines the 
types of evidence used to determine novelty. 90 
Utility.  An invention with no known purpose or that produces something with 
no known application is not considered to be useful.91 
Nonobviousness.  This requirement evaluates an invention according to the 
perspective of a Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art (PHOSITA) and asks the 
question of whether it would have been obvious for that person to combine known 
elements to make the claimed invention.92 
Enablement.  This last requirement also relies on the concept of a PHOSITA 
and asks whether the written description in the patent or patent application shares 
                                                                                                     
103.”). While Flook disagreed with the “coarse filter,” it articulated the principle succinctly. Id. 
Nonetheless, the USPTO continued to rely on the “coarse filter” approach in patent examination until 
shortly after the Alice decision. Compare 2106 MPEP, infra note 94, with source cited infra note 208. 
 85.  See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-62 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (detailing statutory interpretation of the 
1952 Patent Act); see also 2107 MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 11, Nov. 2013) (“Office personnel are to adhere to 
the following procedures when reviewing patent applications for compliance with the ‘useful invention’ 
(‘utility’) requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101 and 35 U.S.C. 112(a) . . . .”). 
 86.  The Great Patent Debate, supra note 40 (“Section 101 was always meant to be a coarse filter, and 
is extremely ill-suited for the fine-grained matters courts are increasingly running through it. Despite an 
express warning from the Supreme Court in the Alice opinion to ‘tread carefully’ in construing Section 
101’s exclusionary principle ‘lest it swallow all of patent law’, the lower courts have read onto Alice a 
command to begin every case touching on patent validity with a Section 101 inquiry.”). 
 87.  Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the 
H. Jud. Comm., 82nd Cong. 37 (1951) (statement of P. J. Federico, Examiner in Chief, United States 
Patent Office) (emphasis added). 
 88.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 89.  See generally In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-62 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 90.  See 35 U.S.C § 102(a)(1) (2012) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— (1) the claimed 
invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available 
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”). 
 91.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). See also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 
531 (1966) (holding that the process for making a new steroid was not useful, because there were no 
known uses for the new steroid); In re Swartz, 232 F. 3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding the denial 
of a patent for cold fusion, because the results could not be duplicated, therefore failing to be useful under 
§ 101 as well as enabled under the “closely related” requirements of § 112, ¶1). 
 92.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole 
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”). 
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enough knowledge so that a PHOSITA could make and use the invention based upon 
the written description.93 
Historically, the USPTO has applied the “coarse filter” of section 101 as a 
measure of patent-eligible subject matter.94  Furthermore, the arguments against the 
application of section 101 as a gatekeeper are based upon the long standing coarse-
filter approach, and even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the application 
of the judicial exceptions is a minority approach and a crude tool—“[t]he Court has 
recognized, however, that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle 
could eviscerate patent law.”95  This Comment argues that the Alice decision is an 
overly broad interpretation of the principle. 
B.  What Is a Software Patent? 
The intellectual property associated with software takes several different forms.  
Software “code” is generally protected by copyright.96  The “look and feel” of 
software applications is protectable as trade dress under trademark law. 97  Patent law 
can protect the design of user interfaces as well as the processes, computing systems, 
and products associated with software.  However, not all software is an “application” 
that runs locally on a computer or mobile device—some software sits behind 
websites, runs on servers, enables various forms of data processing, provides 
connectivity with databases, and supports corporate applications.  Furthermore,  
the term ‘software patent,’ . . . is often used to refer to many different types of 
patented innovation. . . . [and] has been used to encompass such inventions as 
electrical patents and business method patents simply because the patented 
innovation uses some type of computer software program in its implementation.98 
Software can qualify for either a design patent or a utility patent.  Design patents 
protect the appearance of something, whereas utility patents protect the way 
something works or functions.  For example, Apple Computer protected its famous 
“slide-to-unlock” feature for mobile devices in two ways: the look of the unlock 
button is protected by a design patent,99 and the functionality of the slide-to-unlock 
button, including the operation of the capacitive touch screen, is protected by a utility 
                                                                                                     
 93.  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.”). 
 94.  See 2106 MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 11, Nov. 2013) (“There are two criteria for determining subject 
matter eligibility and both must be satisfied. The claimed invention (1) must be directed to one of the four 
statutory categories, and (2) must not be wholly directed to subject matter encompassing a judicially 
recognized exception[.]”). 
 95.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) [hereinafter 
Mayo]. 
 96.  See 17 U.S.C. § 100 (2012) (including a definition for “computer program.”); 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(1990) (defining the scope of copyright protection and statutory protections against overlap with patent 
rights). 
 97.  See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2012). 
 98.  Adam Mossoff, A Brief History of Software Patents (and Why They’re Valid), CENTER FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Sept. 18, 
2013), http://cpip.gmu.edu/2013/09/18/a-brief-history-of-software-patents-and-why-theyre-valid-2/. 
 99.  U.S. Patent No. D675,639 (filed Sep. 19, 2011). 
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patent.100 
Software and software-related technologies that qualify for utility patents are 
found in classes 700-19 and 726 of the U.S. Patent Classification (USPC).  Within 
the four statutory categories of invention, software can be patented in three of the 
categories: as processes, machines, and articles of manufacture.101  As a result, patent 
drafters tend to write claims encompassing all three types of invention.102  However, 
regardless of whether a software patent claims a process, machine, or article of 
manufacture, the method inherent to software is considered dominant, and the 
method is especially vulnerable to attack as an “abstract idea” as articulated in 
Alice.103 
Software has become an important sector in the U.S. economy to the point that 
U.S. companies increasingly invest capital in software.  To protect these software 
investments, U.S. companies obtain software patents, and today, software patents 
account for nearly a quarter of all patents issued each year by the USPTO.  Software 
patents rely on method claims, and method claims are in jeopardy as a result of Alice.  
This means that close to a quarter of patents issued each year are threatened by Alice 
and are potentially valueless as a result of the Supreme Court’s actions. 
C.  Software Patents Are Important to The U.S. Economy 
It is no secret that over the past fifty years104 software and the Internet have 
become an important part of the U.S. economy.105  Also, it is no secret that the U.S. 
manufacturing sector has experienced rapid declines in the early part of the 21st 
Century.106  The growth in the software industry has been accompanied by a growth 
in software intellectual property (IP) investment as well as growth in software 
patents.107  Today, software accounts for nearly half of all U.S. IP investment, and 
software-related innovations account for a quarter of all U.S. patents issued each 
year.108  
                                                                                                     
 100.  U.S. Patent No. 8,665,225 (filed Jun. 30, 2008). 
 101.  See Part I.D.1 infra. 
 102.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 (filed Apr. 11, 2008) (showing a single patent in which a 
mobile device and user interface is protected under system, method, and article of manufacture 
(Beauregard) claims). 
 103.  Mossoff, supra note 98. 
 104.  See Barry M. Leiner, et al, Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY, 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2014) (“[B]y the end of 1969, four host computers were connected together into the initial 
ARPANET, and the budding Internet was off the ground.”); Milestones in AT&T History, AT&T, 
http://www.thocp.net/companies/att/att_company.htm (last visited Sep. 2, 2015) (“1971: Researchers at 
Bell Telephone Laboratories create the Unix computer operating system, which is designed to be hardware 
independent. It eventually becomes the underlying language of the Internet.”). 
 105.  See, e.g., Powerful People #7 Bill Gates, FORBES MAG, http://www.forbes.com/profile/bill-gates 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (identifying Microsoft founder, Bill Gates, as “America’s richest man”). 
 106.  See, e.g., Justin R. Pierce and Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly Swift Decline of U.S. 
Manufacturing Employment, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FINANCE AND ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES at 2 
(Apr. 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2014/201404/201404pap.pdf (“U.S. 
manufacturing employment fluctuated around 18 million workers between 1965 and 2000 before plunging 
18 percent from March 2001 to March 2007.”). 
 107.  See infra notes 109–117 and accompanying text. 
 108.  See infra notes 112–116 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 1 shows that in 2012, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis calculated 
that industries that produce information and communications technologies (ICT) 
account for $1.66 trillion in revenues, or 6.6%, of the U.S. private-sector Gross 
Domestic Product.109  By comparison, manufacturing generates revenues of $5.8 
trillion, which accounts for 23%110 of the U.S. private-sector economy and is roughly 
three and a half times the size of the ICT industry. 
 
Figure 1: Manufacturing and ICT As A Percentage Of U.S. Private-Sector GDP (1997-
2012)111 
However, as Figure 2 demonstrates, U.S. companies have made significant changes 
in the ways in which they invest in intellectual property products.112  In 1970, 
software accounted for 12.8% of IP investment, compared to 59.8% for 
manufacturing.  Today those numbers have shifted, with U.S. companies investing 
three dollars in software for every two dollars they invest in manufacturing 
                                                                                                     
 109.  Industry Data, GDP-By-Industry, U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_industry_gdpIndy.cfm (interactive table; follow “Begin using the data” 
button) (last visited Sept. 7, 2015) (“Information communications technology producing industries—
Consists of computer and electronic product manufacturing . . . software publishers; broadcasting and 
telecommunications; data processing, hosting and related services; internet publishing and broadcasting 
and web search portals; and computer systems design and related services.”). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Steven Rosenthal et al., Integrated Industry-Level Production Account for the United States: 
Intellectual Property Products and the 2007 NAICS, U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS AND U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, (June 25, 2014) http://www.bea.gov/industry/pdf/ 
IntegratedProductionAccount_3rdWorldKlems_BEA_BLS_paper.pdf (“[I]ntellectual property products 
[are] expenditures on R&D and on entertainment, artistic, and literary originals [which] were added as 
new intangible-capital formation.”) (last visited Sept. 7, 2015). 
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technologies.113  Software accounts for $295 billion a year in IP investment.114 
 
Figure 2: U.S. Private Intellectual Property Investment (1970–2013)115 
Increased investments in software intellectual property products have also led to an 
increase in patenting of software and related electrical and computer technologies.  
As chronicled in Figure 3, the number of issued software patents, as defined by the 
U.S. data processing categories in classes 700 through 719,116 has grown over the 
past twenty years, both in terms of raw numbers and as a percentage of issued U.S. 
patents. 
                                                                                                     
 113.  National Data, Table 5.6.5. Private Fixed Investment in Intellectual Property Products by Type, 
U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm (interactive table; follow 
“Begin using the data” button) (last visited Sept. 7, 2015) (demonstrating that, in 2013 U.S. companies 
invested 45.5%, or $295 billion, of their annual IP investments in software, compared to 32.5% for IP 
investments in manufacturing). In 1970, U.S. companies invested five dollars in manufacturing 
technologies for every dollar investment in software. Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See US Classes by Number with Title Menu, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/selectnumwithtitle.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2015) 
(linking to definitions for individual U.S. patent classifications). 
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Figure 3: Growth In U.S. Software Patents (1993-2013)117  
Today, software patents account for 22.6% of all patents issued in the United 
States.118  This number is potentially much larger because patents are often 
categorized in multiple patent classes, and software innovations related to other types 
of invention may be found in secondary classes not counted in the USPTO 
statistics.119  Also, given that it takes three or more years for the USPTO to issue a 
patent based upon an application, patent statistics tend to lag behind actual 
technology investments.  For example, the jump in software patents in the late 1990s 
most likely resulted from investments several years earlier, and the increase in 
software patents around 2006 was likely the result of patent applications filed during 
the technology boom of the late 1990s.120 
A shift in IP investment is but one part of a much larger economic change in 
which the United States has transitioned from an economy focused on manufacturing 
to one dominated by information, software, and services.121  There have been 
repercussions in other areas, such as the law, where the U.S. patent system continues 
                                                                                                     
 117.  Patent Technology Monitoring Team, Patent Counts By Class By Year, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm (Part I table, classes 
700-19) (last visited Sept. 7, 2015). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See, e.g., Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, at 16 (Nov. 20, 2013). http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/ 
USPTOFY2013PAR.pdf (tracking the time from application to issue for utility patents; between 2009 and 
2013, the average patent took approximately 33 months from application to issue). 
 121.  See, e.g., futurework - Trends and Challenges for Work in the 21st Century, Chapter 6 - 
Technology, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/herman/reports/ 
futurework/report/chapter6/main.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2015) (noting that information technology has 
changed the nature of the American workplace). 
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to struggle to keep pace with developments in computing, software, and business.  
As U.S. companies trade increasingly in intangible creations—ideas, plans, designs, 
approaches to management and so forth— intellectual property, and specifically 
patents, have become the key mode for protecting the underlying innovation.122  The 
areas of technology that include software are especially contentious.  For example, 
the USPTO recently introduced a set of administrative post patent grant proceedings 
in which third parties may challenge the validity of an issued patent,123 and to date 
71% of these proceedings have related to patents in the “Electrical/Computer” arts.124 
D.  Software Patents Hinge On Method Claims 
With software-related innovations accounting for nearly a quarter of U.S. 
patents, software patents have become an important part of the U.S. patent system.  
In addition to the useful improvements inherent to software, the term “software 
patents” also refers to patented innovations that require some form of computer 
software in order to implement them, such as inventions involving electrical 
technologies and business methods.125  While software may be patented in a number 
of ways, courts have focused patent invalidity challenges on the methods claimed in 
software patents.126  Before this Comment addresses this case law and the recent 
Alice decision, it is important to address the four categories of invention and the ways 
in which software fits into these categories. 
1.  The Four Categories of Invention 
Section 101 of the modern patent statute recites what appears to be a relatively 
simple rule that inventions must fit within four categories: processes, machines, 
articles of manufacture, and compositions of matter.127  The Supreme Court has 
changed the way section 101 operates by removing a broad range of subject matter 
from section 101128 with what are known as the “judicial exceptions” to section 
                                                                                                     
 122.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent Activity, Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, Table of Annual U.S. Patent 
Activity Since 1790, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (showing that U.S. utility patent applications have 
grown steadily at 5.8% annually over the past 30 years). 
 123.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–329 (2012) (revising reexamination proceedings and creating Inter Partes 
Review (IPR), Post Grant Review (PGR) and the Transitional Program for Covered Business Method 
Patents (CBM)). 
 124.  AIA Progress Statistics – Graphical View and Subsets, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 
23, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/102314_aia_stat_graph.pdf. See also Patrick 
Driscoll and Michael McNamara, Inter Partes Review Initial Filings of Paramount Importance: What Is 
Clear After Two Years of Inter Partes Review Under the AIA, MINTZ LEVIN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ADVISORY (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2014/advisories/4363-1014-nat-ip 
(calculating that only 9% of all patents that enter post-grant proceedings survive without having at least 
one claim cancelled). 
 125.  See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 126.  See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (“Put another way, the 
system claims are no different from the method claims in substance.”). 
 127.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 128.  See discussion infra Part II. 
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101.129 Namely, the “judicial exceptions” are, “laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas are not patentable.”130 
The USPTO continues to issue, and courts continue to uphold, software patents 
in a number of USPC technology classes131 for inventions claiming methods, 
systems, and articles of manufacture.  However, regardless of which type of 
invention a software patent claims, the validity of the patent hinges on the validity 
of the underlying process132 as articulated in what are known as “method claims.”133 
a.  Patent Claims 
There are several parts to a patent application, including a specification, a 
drawing, and an oath or declaration.134  The specification includes a written 
description of the invention that can include drawings and diagrams; the purpose of 
the written description is to explain to others how to make and use the patented 
invention.135  Within the specification, the claims define the scope of the invention.136 
The claims begin with “I claim:” and include each specific claim.137  For 
example, U.S. Patent No. 6,206,000 for a “Canine scuba diving apparatus” includes 
the following claim: 
I claim: 
1. An underwater self-contained breathing apparatus for use by a canine, 
comprising: 
a transparent rigid helmet having a skirted opening for the wearer’s neck, the helmet 
being sufficiently large to avoid contact with the face or nose of the canine user; 
a regulator for supplying a breathable gas attached to the helmet; 
a means of adjusting a position of a demand valve in the regulator to pressurize the 
helmet at no less than ambient pressure; 
a harness attached to the helmet; 
means for fastening the harness around the wearer’s torso; and 
one or more pockets in the harness for receiving ballast weights.138  
                                                                                                     
 129.  See supra note 94. 
 130.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (quoting Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 131.  See supra Figure 3. 
 132.  Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (holding system claims for a general 
purpose computer to be invalid, because the method claims had been determined to be invalid); contra 
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a system claim 
with a single component in Canada and the rest of the system in the United States was infringed but that 
the method claim with a single step performed in Canada was not infringed). 
 133.  See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 98. 
 134.  35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2) (2012) (enumerating the contents of a patent application). 
 135.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or 
joint inventor of carrying out the invention.”); see also 37 C.F.R. 1.71(a) (2011). 
 136.  35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as 
the invention.”). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  U.S. Patent No. 6,206,000 (filed Apr. 30, 1997). 
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This is an “apparatus claim” for a machine invention.  Claim One here incorporates 
a preamble followed by the open-ended term “comprising.”139  Each subsequent line 
in the claim is a specific limitation including each element that must be found in the 
invention.  For example, this claim is limited to inventions with all six components—
helmet, regulator, adusting means, harness, fastening means, ballast pockets—and 
products that include all these elements may infringe this patent.  However, a product 
that does not have all six of these components most likely does not infringe this 
patent, though such a product may infringe another patent.140  Depending on the type 
of invention, a patent may include various types of claims.141 
2.  Software Within The Four Categories of Invention 
The four categories of patentable invention are machines, processes, articles of 
manufacture, and compositions of matter.142  First of all, software is not a 
composition of matter, which is defined to be “all compositions of two or more 
substances.”143  However, the remaining three categories provide patent protection 
for software and software-related inventions.144 
a.  Software as Process 
In U.S. patent law, “[t]he term ‘process’ means process, art, or method, and 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of 
matter, or material.”145  Method claims are similar to other types of claims.  For 
example, in Alice, one of the patents in question was U.S. Patent 5,970,479 (the “‘479 
patent”), which included the following independent claim: “33. A method of 
exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a 
debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for 
exchange of predetermined obligations . . . .”146 
 Software encompasses processes or methods for manipulating information, and 
                                                                                                     
 139.  2111.03 MPEP (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) (outlining the interpretation of transitional phrases 
such as “comprising” and “consisting of” in patent claims). 
 140.  There are three issues raised by this point. First, if there were also a patent that had five of these 
six component limitations, then the inventor here may have added the sixth limitation in order to 
distinguish his invention from an earlier patent. Alternatively, the sixth component may have turned the 
invention into a much better product for canine scuba. Second, this situation outlines the patent as a right 
to exclude but not to include; the patent owner can exclude others from making products with all six 
components, but the patent is not a license to make a product with all six components because there may 
be an earlier patent on a canine scuba apparatus with five of the six components, because products 
including all six components infringe the earlier five-component patent. Third, if the six-component 
product infringes the five-component patent, there are still numerous reasons why an inventor would 
bother to make the improvement and acquire the patent. 
 141.  3-8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.03 (2014). 
 142.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 143.  See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“In choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ 
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given 
wide scope.”). 
 144.  See supra note 102. 
 145.  35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012). 
 146.  U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (filed May 28, 1993). 
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while patents may incorporate aspects of a software invention, the method claims are 
the foundation.147  The underlying method is often central to the patentability and 
infringement of the other types of claimed inventions, but this serves to narrow the 
rights afforded the system and product claims.  For example, in comparison to other 
types of inventions, the patentability of the method narrows the patentability of 
articles of manufacture148 and product-by-process149 claims. 
In situations where only a process patent exists, a machine that exclusively 
performs that process only infringes the underlying patent when it is used; selling or 
transferring the machine does not constitute infringement.150  Furthermore, software 
that embodies a process or algorithm—and without an accompanying physical 
embodiment such as a system or product—can end up in the murky territory of 
“abstract ideas,” 151 which may not be patentable subject matter152 and which may 
lead to the invalidation of a patent at trial under the principles outlined in Alice.153  
In Alice, the Supreme Court upheld the invalidation of four different patents—two 
of which did not have method claims—based upon the abstract idea analysis 
originating from the method claims of the other two patents.154 
                                                                                                     
 147.  See In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 159-60 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Rich, J. dissenting), (citations 
omitted) (“It has never been otherwise than perfectly clear to those desiring patent protection on inventions 
which are new and useful programs for general purpose computers (software) that the only way it could 
be obtained would be to describe and claim (35 U.S.C. § 112) the invention as a ‘process’ or a ‘machine.’ 
. . . This has been demonstrated time and again by the computer program cases which have come to this 
court.”). 
 148.  CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding a 
Beauregard claim enacting a method to be invalid when the corresponding method claim was invalidated); 
In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (invalidating an apparatus claim when the underlying method 
claim was held to be unpatentable). Contra Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1213 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding the Beauregard claims but invalidating the method claims). 
 149.  See 2113 MPEP (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012). Product-by-process claims face two separate 
inquiries: the patentability of the process, and the patentability of the product itself.  Either inquiry can be 
dispositive of patent rights. See In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) 
(“[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of 
patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method 
of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of 
the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process.”). 
 150.  See, e.g., Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 776 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he injunction cannot 
be sustained on the . . . sales of equipment without use of the method.”). 
 151.  Mossoff, supra note 98 (“One of the primary problems with the term ‘software patent’ is that, 
like other widely used terms in the patent policy debates today, it lacks an objective definition. For 
instance, many critics of ‘software patents’ attack them as patents on ‘mathematics’ or patents on a 
‘mathematical algorithm[.]’”). 
 152.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2013)) (“We have long held that [section 101] contains 
an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable. 
Rather, they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work that lie beyond the domain of patent 
protection.”). 
 153.  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349-50 (2014) (holding software for settling 
accounts between trading parties to be unpatentable as an abstract idea); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593, 604 (2010). 
 154.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (“Because petitioner’s system and media claims add nothing 
of substance to the underlying abstract idea, we hold that they too are patent ineligible under § 101.”). 
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b.  Software as a Machine 
In the category of machine inventions, software running on a computer is for all 
intents and purposes a “machine,”155 protectable with language in a patent that is 
referred to as an “apparatus” or “system” claim.  Often, system claims may include 
a user interface.  Also, given the rapid development of computing technologies, the 
machine envisioned by a system claim may take very different forms a decade later 
when the patent owner seeks to enforce its IP rights.156  Of course, this is a desirable 
outcome because the policy behind the patent system is to encourage disclosure of 
inventions and to avoid grants of broad monopolies to inventors who have conceived 
of an idea but who have not reduced their invention to practice.157 
c.  Software Outputs as Articles of Manufacture 
For the past two decades, companies have been patenting software as an article 
of manufacture by employing Beauregard158 claims which incorporate the software 
onto “a computer readable medium.”159  However, Beauregard claims are limited in 
effectiveness to any corresponding method claims, and if a court holds the method 
claims to be invalid, any dependent Beauregard claims will also be invalid.160 
Software can be linked to a medium of some kind and patented as an article of 
manufacture, but the output of software—transformed and manipulated data—is 
more difficult to patent.  Courts have been unwilling to interpret “information” or 
the general output of software to be a product or an article of manufacture.  For 
example, in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group,161 the Federal 
Circuit validated the patentability of a system that performed a data transformation, 
“because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’—a final share price 
momentarily  fixed for recording and reporting purposes. . . .”162  And yet, that 
result—the transformed data in the form of a final share price—would be difficult to 
patent as an “article of manufacture,” because it would lack the novelty required 
                                                                                                     
 155.  See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“[C]laim 1, properly construed, claims a machine, namely a data processing system for managing a 
financial services configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership, which machine is made up of, 
at the very least, the specific structures disclosed in the written description and corresponding to the 
means-plus-function elements (a)-(g) recited in the claim.”). 
 156.  See Heather J. DiPietrantonio and Edmund J. Walsh, Inside Views: Getting The Most Value From 
Your Patent Claims, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Apr, 8, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/ 
2011/08/04/getting-the-most-value-from-your-patent-claims/. 
 157.  See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 63 (1853) (invalidating Samuel Morse’s claim 8 to all forms 
of telecommunication using electromagnetic radiation “however developed” for claiming beyond the 
scope of his actual invention, the telegraph). Contra Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. 
(Incandescent Lamp Patent), 159 U.S. 465, 472 (1895) (overturning a patent that claimed a genus of 
incandescing filaments, because Thomas Edison filed a later patent application for a species of the genus). 
 158.  In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 159.  Id. at 1583. 
 160.  CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding a 
Beauregard claim enacting a method to be invalid when the corresponding method claim was invalidated); 
In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (invalidating an apparatus claim when the underlying method 
claim was held to be unpatentable). 
 161.  149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 162.  Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
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under section 102 of the Patent Act.163  
3.  Method Claims Are Protected Differently 
Software patents are synonymous with method claims.164  Method claims are 
unique, because infringement of a method claim requires that a single party perform 
all of the steps in a claimed process.165  A party selling or licensing the “know how” 
inherent to a process is not the same as performing the process.  For that reason, 
licensing of a patented process does not rise to the level of “selling” for purposes of 
the Patent Act.166  Without a separate system claim addressing the physical 
embodiment of the process, the owner of a process patent cannot prevent another 
party from making or selling a machine that performs the patented process, even if 
the sole purpose of the machine is to perform the patented process.167  And yet, even 
if a software patent includes a machine or article of manufacture claim, the 
patentability of the machine and product will be limited according to the patentability 
of the underlying method.168  However, in an infringement analysis, the method must 
be performed in order to find infringement of the machine or article of manufacture 
claims, because the infringement of the method claim can only come through use.169 
E.  “Abstract Ideas”—The Challenge For Software Patents 
A software patent provides intellectual property protection for the way a 
software-related technology functions or is designed.170  In general, software patents 
encompass a wide range of technologies, from electrical circuitry, computers, data 
processing, robotics, and telecommunications to business methods.  This is because 
various forms of software are used to implement inventions in these technology 
areas.171  Software patents are distinct from, and provide different protections than, 
trademarks and copyright.172 
Over the past fifty years, software patents have become an important aspect of 
the U.S. economy.  Between 2012 and 2013, software represented $1.66 trillion in 
U.S. gross domestic product, $295 billion in annual private investment.  In addition, 
software patents constitute an expanding proportion of patent law, with 70,000 
patents issued, accounting for 22.6% of all U.S. patents.173 
                                                                                                     
 163.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 164.  Mossoff, supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 165.  Roberts Dairy Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citations omitted) (“It is 
well established that a patent for a method or process is not infringed unless all steps or stages of the 
claimed process are utilized.”). 
 166.  See In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the licensing of technology 
covered by a patent does not invoke the “on sale” bar under section 102(b) of the Patent Act). 
 167.  See Karen G. Hazzah, Are system claims better than method claims for computer-implemented 
inventions?, ALL THINGS PROS (Mar. 6, 2011) http://allthingspros.blogspot.com/2011/03/are-system-
claims-better-than-method.html; Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 776 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he 
injunction cannot be sustained on the . . . sales of equipment without use of the method[.]”). 
 168.  See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 169.  See supra note 167. 
 170.  See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
 171.  See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
 172.  See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
 173.  See supra Part I.C. 
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At the same time, software is vulnerable, because software and software-related 
inventions depend on method claims, which offer broader protections than other 
types of inventions, but are plagued by case law that has created gaps in coverage for 
processes and methods.174  Software is afforded less protection in the U.S. patent 
system than are physical products, manufactured goods, and manufacturing 
processes.175  
However, the greatest challenge software faces is the “abstract ideas” judicial 
exception to section 101.  The Supreme Court has found some types of processes 
performed by software to be “abstract ideas” that are not patentable under section 
101 of the Patent Act.176  This has enabled accused infringers to assert that a software 
patent claims an abstract idea and to ask a court to invalidate the patent in pretrial 
motions.177  
In 2013, Randall Rader, then Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, pointed to 
USPTO post-grant adversarial proceedings where a large number of issued patents 
had been invalidated, calling these proceedings “death squads” for patents.178  Rader 
also noted that the Federal Circuit’s decision in CLS Bank International v. Alice 
Corporation179—the precursor to the Alice decision—was the greatest failure of his 
judicial career.180 
There is no comparison between USPTO post-grant proceedings and the Alice 
decision, because for reasons to be discussed later in this Comment, Alice provides 
a significantly faster and more cost-effective way for an accused infringer to 
invalidate a software patent without a single evidentiary hearing, and without claim 
construction.181 
II.  ALICE AND A NEW ERA OF PATENT LAW 
In few areas has patent law been as contentious as it has been in the area of 
                                                                                                     
 174.  See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text. 
 175.  See supra Part I.D. 
 176.  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351-2352, (2014) (invalidating a software 
patent for an exchange trading system, holding the claims to be directed to an abstract idea); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (holding a scheme for computerized economic hedging to be an abstract 
idea as opposed to patentable subject matter); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1972) 
(invalidating a method patent claiming the conversion to and from binary numbers on a computer). 
 177.  See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“[T]he parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the asserted claims are eligible for 
patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The District Court held that all of the claims are patent ineligible 
because they are directed to the abstract idea of employing a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultaneous 
exchange of obligations in order to minimize risk.”). 
 178.  See Brian Mahoney, Software Patent Ruling a Major Judicial Failure, Rader Says, LAW 360 
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/482264. 
 179.  717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 180.  See supra note 178. See generally CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1334-35 (Rader, C.J., additional 
reflections) (“Twenty years ago, Judges Newman, Lourie, and I still unanimously agreed on the outcome 
of Arrythmia. The intervening commotion leaves us with little, if any, agreement amongst us even though 
the statute has not changed a syllable[.]”). 
 181.  See infra Part II.C. By comparison, the AIA post-grant proceedings provide all those tools in a 
hearing before a panel of technically-trained patent judges. See infra Part II.C.4. 
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software.  Since the late 1960s and early 1970s,182 courts have wrestled with the 
question of whether software is a patent-eligible invention to be addressed as a legal 
question under section 101183 of the Patent Act, or if section 101 is a “coarse filter,”184 
making the primary issues of software patentability mixed questions of fact and law 
addressed in other sections of the statute.185  
The validity of a patent takes center stage when a patent owner seeks to enforce 
the patent right, because invalidity is a statutory defense to infringement.186  As a 
legal question, section 101 opens the door for an accused patent infringer to take an 
early exit in pretrial motions or at any point until a jury verdict is final.  If a patent is 
directed to ineligible subject matter, a court could determine, based solely upon a 
reading of the patent, that the patent claim is invalid and the infringement suit should 
be dismissed.187 
The Supreme Court has created doctrine stating three exceptions to patent 
eligibility under section 101—laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.188  One of those exceptions—abstract ideas—is the primary avenue for 
challenging the validity of software patents.189  The Alice decision defines the newest 
test for applying the abstract idea judicial exception to a software patent and 
determining whether the subject matter of a software invention is eligible for a patent 
and whether an issued software patent is valid and enforceable.190  The practical 
effect of Alice will be mass judicial invalidation of software patents that will require 
technology companies to intervene and push for corrective changes to the Patent 
Act.191 
                                                                                                     
 182.  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (evaluating the subject-matter eligibility of 
software that performed binary code conversion); In re Chatfield, 545 F. 2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re 
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 183.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 184.  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952)) (“The § 101 patent-
eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test. . . . The claimed invention must also satisfy the ‘conditions and 
requirements of [the Patent Act].’”). 
 185.  35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 & 112 (2011). See also David J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath Swaine & 
Moore LLP, The Great Patent Debate: Changing Horizons, Address at Intellectual Asset Management 
(IPBC/Global) Meeting the NPE Challenge (Mar. 13, 2015), available at http://www.iam-
media.com/files/Kappos%20speech.pdf (“Section 101 was always meant to be a coarse filter, and is 
extremely ill-suited for the fine-grained matters courts are increasingly running through it. Despite an 
express warning from the Supreme Court in the Alice opinion to ‘tread carefully’ in construing Section 
101’s exclusionary principle ‘lest it swallow all of patent law’, the lower courts have read onto Alice a 
command to begin every case touching on patent validity with a Section 101 inquiry. . . . The courts need 
to place primary emphasis on the Section 102, 103, and 112 standards for patentability. They will find 
most inquiries better addressed, and more helpfully addressed for patentees and the public alike, under 
these standards.”). 
 186.  35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or 
infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement, 
or unenforceability. (2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II as a 
condition for patentability. . . .”). 
 187.  See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 188.  See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 189.  Mossoff, supra note 98. 
 190.  See generally Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 191.  See discussion infra Parts II.B, III. 
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A.  Alice Decision 
The context for Alice comes from a procedural shift in the type of section 101 
cases that the Supreme Court has recently begun taking, as well as two recent cases 
in which the Supreme Court evaluated the patentability of method patents under 
section 101. 
1.  Ex Parte Appeals Have Dominated 
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of the patentability of software 
in 1972 in Gottschalk v. Benson.192  At the time, the Court noted that a presidential 
commission had recommended changing the 1952 Act to give greater deference to 
Congress and to make it clear that software could not be patented.  The Court then 
established the first precedent193 for judicial exceptions to section 101.194  Over the 
next forty years, section 101 and the patentability of software remained a question 
addressed almost entirely at the patent office and in appeals of ex parte denials of 
patent application.  These appeals remained exclusively in the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, which retains exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent 
cases.195 
Between 1972 and 2010, the Supreme Court heard five section 101 cases, all of 
which were appeals of ex parte patent rejections during patent prosecution.196  In this 
type of case, no patent has issued, the applicant has appealed a final rejection to the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 197 and the patent applicant has initiated a 
lawsuit to review the USPTO patent denial.198  In the appeal before the Supreme 
Court, the patent applicant argues against the patent office solicitor.199 
There is a second type of case that involves patents that have passed the regime 
of examination, have been issued, and are presumed valid and enforceable as against 
potential infringers.200  Since 2012, the Supreme Court has reviewed three such 
section 101 cases resulting from an invalidity challenge to an issued patent involved 
in litigation at the time.  The first two, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories201 and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,202 
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 194.  See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 72-73. 
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were focused on biotechnology.  The third was Alice. 
2.  Bilski & Mayo 
In the 2010 Bilski v. Kappos203 decision, the Supreme Court determined that 
nothing in the Patent Act precluded the patenting of software or business methods.  
In a narrow application of post-Benson case law, the Court upheld the Federal Circuit 
and determined that an economic hedging algorithm was not patent eligible subject 
matter under section 101.  However, the Court disapproved of the Federal Circuit’s 
proposal of an exclusive “machine-or-transformation” test and otherwise provided 
little guidance as to a test for section 101.204  This presented challenges, because in 
In re Bilski205 the Federal Circuit had departed from the use of two of its earlier 
section 101 tests for software: the Freeman-Walter-Abele test,206 and the “useful, 
concrete and tangible result” test.207  Since Bilski, patent attorneys, courts, and the 
USPTO, have struggled to find a test from Bilski or elsewhere to determine whether 
a software patent claims an excepted “abstract idea.”208 
In the 2012 Mayo v. Prometheus209 decision, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
patent for the treatment of Crohn’s Disease and outlined a test for Section 101 
subject-matter eligibility that requires “an examination of the particular claims 
before us in light of the Court’s precedents.”210  Furthermore, the test in Mayo said 
that if a patented process focuses on the use of a natural law, the court must look for 
“other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive 
concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more 
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”211  The inclusion of an “inventive concept” 
in the analysis, though not new, appeared to be problematic.212  However, the 
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 209.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 210.  Id. at 1294. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (“Our approach to respondent’s application 
is, however, not at all inconsistent with the view that a patent claim must be considered as a whole.  
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decision did not address “abstract ideas” or “software,” and many in the patent 
community breathed a sigh of relief and interpreted Mayo to relate specifically to the 
judicial exceptions of natural phenomena and laws of nature.213 
3.  Facts and Travel of Alice 
Alice Corporation is an Australian company that owns a number of patents 
related to financial services.214  The patents include numerous claims, including 
method claims, system (or machine) claims, and product (article of manufacture) 
claims.215  CLS Bank sued Alice in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia for declaratory judgment that the patent claims were not infringed, as they 
were invalid and unenforceable.216  Alice filed cross motions for infringement.  Both 
parties then moved for summary judgment—which the district court granted in favor 
of CLS, reasoning that the patents claimed an “abstract idea” which was covered as 
an exception to patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act.217 
A divided Federal Circuit panel reversed the district court.218  Upon rehearing 
en banc, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of CLS Bank in a one-paragraph per curiam decision that was followed by 
four concurrences and dissents, as well as “additional reflections” from Chief Judge 
Rader.  It is a heavily divided decision with no clear agreement. 219 
4.  Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International220 
In 2014, the Supreme Court responded with a unanimous 9-0 decision in Alice, 
explaining that the Mayo test also applies to the abstract ideas judicial exception, 
and that Mayo had, in fact, “set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that 
claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim 
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.”221  Furthermore, the Court clarified 
that Mayo had articulated a two-step test:  
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-
ineligible concepts.  If so, we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’  
                                                                                                     
Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other 
inventive concept in its application.”). 
 213.  See Commissioner for Patents, Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme 
Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al., U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, (Jun. 25, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/announce/ 
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 214.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 215.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (filed May 28, 1993). 
 216.  CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1273. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. at 1313. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 221.  Id. at 2355. 
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To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually 
and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements 
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.  We have 
described step two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept’— i.e., an 
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] 
itself.’222 
Following this test, the Court found that Alice Corporation’s invention of a 
global financial trading process and system was not eligible for a patent, because 
“the claims at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to 
apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic 
computer.  Under our precedents, that is not ‘enough’ to transform an abstract idea 
into a patent-eligible invention.”223  The court then dismissed Alice’s “machine”224 
and article of “manufacture”225 claims as patent ineligible under Section 101, 
reasoning that these claims “add nothing of substance to the underlying abstract 
idea.”226 
Since the Alice decision, as of March 2015, Article III courts have applied the 
Alice test seventy-eight times and have invalidated fifty-five patents in the process.227  
As Judge Moore warned in her dissent in part to the Federal Circuit decision 
preceding Alice, “this case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including 
all business method, financial system, and software patents as well as many computer 
implemented and telecommunications patents.”228 
For example, in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,229 the Federal Circuit 
evaluated, for a third time, an interactive video advertising insertion patent that the 
court had upheld twice before under Section 101.230  As the saying goes, the third 
time’s the charm: a Federal Circuit panel applied the Alice test and determined that 
Ultramercial’s granted patent “claims are directed to no more than a patent-ineligible 
abstract idea” and are therefore invalid.231  That being said, not every application of 
Alice invalidates a patent—the Federal Circuit has applied the Alice test and has 
upheld patent eligibility,232 as have district courts.233 
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B.  Measurable Post-Alice Impacts 
The impact of Alice is significant, because in the first seven months following 
the decision, “over one hundred patents have been invalidated for claiming ineligible 
subject matter, more than the total number of patents invalidated under Section 101 
in the past five years. . . . [and] in the next six months we are likely to see another 
hundred patents invalidated.”234 
The law firm Fenwick & West has been tracking Alice statistics on a weekly 
basis and reported in April 2015 that in more than seventy-eight court decisions, 117 
patents have been invalidated, accounting for 3,026 invalidated claims at a claim 
rejection rate of over 80%.235  This is significant because these are judicial 
determinations—as a matter of law—about the patent eligibility of patented 
inventions, without any claim construction or factual findings.  Furthermore, each of 
these decisions relates to issued patents that have been through the examination 
process and are otherwise afforded the presumption of validity.236 
1.  Business Implications 
The true significance of Alice is best understood from the perspective  
technology companies, many of which have invested in software innovation and also 
invested tens of thousands of dollars in acquiring one of the 68,374 software-related 
patents issued in 2013.237  Management of these companies are asking a series of 
questions about the investments they have made in software-based innovation, the 
company’s ability to continue relying on software investments, and the company’s 
ability to prevent competitors from copying their underlying technology.  
The attorney representing a technology company that is active in software-based 
business has most likely already presented the bleak news to corporate management.  
First, existing software patents may be worthless.  Whether a company has a few, a 
dozen, hundreds, or even thousands of software patents, each and every one may be 
worth nothing.  This may represent millions of dollars in research and development 
as well as hundreds of thousands of dollars, or more, in patent investments.238 
Second, in-process patent applications may be saved.  For those inventions 
capable of passing the Alice test, existing patent claims may need to be amended.  
Alternatively, family patents, such as continuations and continuations-in-part may 
be possible to obtain so long as amended, Alice-ready claims are supported by the 
existing patent specification.  Third, patents that cannot be saved may lose priority 
and may be prior art as against future innovations.  There may be a generation of 
innovations that will be excluded from patent protection.  Fourth, a company’s 
licensing agreements and patent portfolio may be in jeopardy. 
While there are many so-called “software” companies that have expressed 
distaste for software patents and continue to lobby against them, there are many other 
companies that continue to invest in software-based technologies and patents to 
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protect those innovations.239 
2.  Patent “Trolls” Are The Elephant In The Room 
The amicus curiae briefs in Alice demonstrate overwhelming support in the 
business community for overturning software patents.240  Within the business and 
software communities, there is extensive opposition to what are called “patent 
trolls.”  For example, a recent opinion piece in the New York Times announced that 
these so-called trolls “make money by threatening companies with expensive 
lawsuits and then using that cudgel, rather than the merits of a case, to extract a 
financial settlement.”241 
It is socially acceptable to dislike patents242 and trolls for any number of reasons, 
and through the past several years, Congress has sought to write new legislation to 
specifically address the abuses of patent litigation.243  In the recent Ultramercial 
decision, Judge Mayer wrote in concurrence that “[r]esolving subject matter 
eligibility at the outset provides a bulwark against vexatious infringement suits.”244  
He goes on to discuss “[t]he scourge of meritless infringement claims” filed by 
patentees “who own vague and overbroad business method patents.”245  
Mayer has been a vocal advocate for applying section 101 as an aggressive 
gatekeeper, but here, he points to his policy argument, that relying on section 101 as 
a gatekeeper and treating it like the heightened pleading requirement of Twombly is 
a desirable policy to eliminate abusive litigation.246 
C.  Legal Implications of Alice 
The legal implications of Alice are messy, because the Court’s section 101 
jurisprudence has become a legislative exercise.  As the Court attempts to limit its 
activism and overreach—and to craft decisions within the narrow context of recent 
decisions such as Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo—each 
subsequent decision becomes even more difficult to apply.  The surprising part of 
Alice is that it is a unanimous 9-0 decision.  This Comment argues that Alice is a poor 
decision that is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the changes inherent to 
the 1952 Act as well as the risks associated with citing cases from before Congress 
changed the statute.  Judge Rich was correct when he said that evaluating 
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“patentability by the presence of ‘invention’ gives judges . . . too much freedom to 
decide patentability of new and useful inventions on the basis of a personal view as 
to what should be patentable, instead of accepting the view of the legislature on that 
question of national policy.”247 
The legal impact of Alice is that tens of thousands of software patents can be 
invalidated.  Many more patent applications have already been rejected or delayed, 
ending overnight patenting in an area of technology that amounts to nearly a quarter 
of all patents issued each year. 
1.  Alice Has Brought Back A Test For “Invention” 
The 1952 Patent Act specifically overturned Cuno’s “flash of genius” test for 
invention and replaced it with a “third requirement” for patentability—section 103 
nonobviousness.248  While other post-1952 Supreme Court decisions have mentioned 
the requirement of an “inventive concept,”249 Alice places the search for an inventive 
concept in step two of the analysis in which a court must look for “something more” 
than the judicial exception.  There are three problems with this.  First, because the 
judicial exceptions are non-statutory, there is no definition of what is and is not 
within the scope of the exceptions; therefore, the decision to say whether a patent 
claims an exception is highly subjective.250  Second, the determination of what is an 
inventive concept is highly subjective and difficult to standardize.251  Third, by 
placing this inquiry inside of a section 101 test for patent eligible subject matter, the 
Court is making a section 103 patentability analysis part of what the Court is 
determining to be a gatekeeping function of section 101—this is recursive logic. 
As discussed in Part II.A.2 supra, the “inventive concept” principle found in 
Mayo and Alice stems from the Supreme Court’s 1978 Flook decision in which the 
Court adopted language from pre-1952 cases.252  However, this pre-1952 common 
law requirement of “invention” had been replaced by the statutory requirement of 
“obviousness” in section 103 of the 1952 Act.253  Furthermore, by design the 1952 
Act made no mention of the term “invention,”254 making the Court’s reliance on the 
term a quarter century later in Flook anomalous and wholly unsupported by the 
statute.  In fact, when the Supreme Court refers to an “inventive concept,” the Court 
is talking about statutory “obviousness” but is using language superseded by statute. 
In Graham,255 the Court clarified that a section 103 obviousness analysis is an 
inherently factual inquiry that depends on a variety of factors, including prior art and 
the capabilities and knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.256  Alice 
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turns Graham on its ear and requires a court considering a judicial exception to 
preview the obviousness analysis as a solely legal question and to determine whether 
a patent—based solely on the claims—is obvious in light of the judicial exception.  
By turning obviousness into a solely legal question, Alice turns back the clock 
on section 103 and creates case law in direct opposition to Graham—at least as it 
relates to the judicial exceptions to statutory subject matter.  The Alice decision 
enables a court to employ a set of “judicial exceptions” to the Patent Act to determine 
that a software patent claims an “abstract idea.” If the court finds an “abstract idea,” 
the court may then perform an obviousness analysis and search for an “inventive 
concept” or “something more” based solely on the patent claims and the court’s 
subjective knowledge—even though the Supreme Court has said that such an inquiry 
is inherently factual.257 
2.  Alice Has Turned Section 101 Into A Gatekeeper 
When Congress passed the 1952 Act, the patent-eligible subject matter aspect 
of section 101 had not been interpreted as a gatekeeper to the rest of the statute.  
Instead, the 1952 Act focused on the patentability requirement that inventions be 
new, useful, and nonobvious.258  Alice places the section 101 exceptions in front of 
those inquiries with some knowledge that the Court must “tread carefully in 
construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”259  On this, 
the horse is already out of the barn, and the judicially-defined attribute of section 101 
has already become a gatekeeper.  However, in Alice the Court did not clarify the 
burdens required of moving parties.  Alice appears to have been decided on a more-
likely-than-not standard, though it is unclear whether, in future Alice analyses, 
patents will be presumed valid,260 and whether the moving party will be required to 
prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.261 
3.  Alice Has Expanded The Scope And Legitimacy Of “Judicial Exceptions” 
In Alice, the Court continued to support the paradoxical concept of a “judicial 
exception” to a statute, rationalizing the exception as longstanding: “[w]e have 
interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in light of this exception for more than 150 
years.”262  Unfortunately, hundred-year-old dictum does not provide a legal basis for 
what is otherwise judicial activism. 
The paradox of a judicial exception is found in a term that acknowledges that 
courts read words that do not exist into a statute that is otherwise clear.  The Court 
has faced few challenges in interpreting section 101,263 and the Court’s claim to 150 
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years of exceptions has no basis in fact. 
These so-called judicial exceptions are on shaky ground for several different 
reasons. First, the sources of these exceptions predate the 1952 Patent Act, and it is 
difficult to translate these earlier cases into modern precedent without factoring in 
the differences between the 1952 Act and the underlying statutes in effect at the time 
as well as the differences between modern uses of words and prior legal meanings 
of terms such as “invent” and “invention.”264 
Second, in the cases cited as stare decisis,265 the referenced text is often dictum 
and not central to the decision of the court.  The premise is often stated without proof 
or reference to any supporting argument.  For example, in Mackay Radio & 
Telegraph v. Radio Corp. of America266 the court announced the enticing axiom that 
“a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention. . 
. .” and then “assume[d], without deciding the point, that this advance was invention 
even though it was achieved by the logical application of a known scientific law to 
a familiar type of antenna.”267  In Mackay Radio, the court found the infringement 
analysis dispositive of the case and never decided on the underlying validity of the 
patent.  Similarly, Le Roy v. Tatham268 is cited as standing for the proposition that 
“[i]t is admitted, that a principle is not patentable.”269  However, the court in Le Roy 
never addressed the subject, because “[t]he question [of the patentability of a 
principle]. . . was not in the case.”270 
Third, in a series of citations beginning with O’Reilly v. Morse, 271 the dictum in 
Le Roy began to stand for the proposition that a “principle” could not be patented.  
The O’Reilly decision said that “the court [in Le Roy] held that he was not entitled to 
a patent for this newly-discovered principle or quality in lead; and that such a 
discovery was not patentable,”272 even though the court never addressed that 
question in Le Roy.273  This quote from O’Reilly is also dictum, because the Court 
never addressed the question of whether a “principle” could be patented, and instead 
ruled Morse’s claim eight invalid for lack of support and enablement in the 
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expression is exacerbated by the fact that prior to the Patent Act of 1952 the words ‘invention,’ ‘inventive,’ 
and ‘invent’ had distinct legal implications related to the concept of patentability which they have not had 
for the past quarter century. Prior to 1952, and for sometime thereafter, they were used by courts as 
imputing patentability. Statements in the older cases must be handled with care lest the terms used in their 
reasoning clash with the reformed terminology of the present statute; lack of meticulous care may lead to 
distorted legal conclusions.”). 
 265.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010). 
 266.  306 U.S. 86 (1939). 
 267.  Id. at 94. 
 268.  55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
 269.  Id. at 174-75. 
 270.  Id. at 177. 
 271.  56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 272.  Id. at 117 (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852)). 
 273.  Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 177. 
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specification.274  And yet, the Court in Tilghman v. Proctor275 asserted that there was 
an altogether different outcome for O’Reilly: “[t]he eighth claim of Morse's patent 
was held to be invalid, because it was regarded by the court as being not for a process, 
but for a mere principle.”276 
Fourth, in much of the precedent, an altogether different principle of patent law 
is in play, and the court does not decide on the basis of patent eligible subject matter, 
making the citation dictum.  For example, O’Reilly v. Morse erroneously cites to 
dictum in Le Roy and yet continues to be cited by the Supreme Court as standing for 
the proposition of a judicial exception to section 101,277 even though O’Reilly has 
long been understood to stand for overbroad claims that were not supported by the 
specification.278 
The citation to O’Reilly in Tilghman is also dictum but continues to be cited to 
stand for the proposition that a principle cannot be patented, even though the only 
challenge to the patent in Tilghman was for lack of usefulness.279  Similarly, in 
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,280 the dictum and the decision are juxtaposed: 
“[a]n idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made 
practically useful is.  The idea of this patentee was a good one, but his device to give 
it effect, though useful, was not new.”281  The patent was invalid for lack of novelty, 
not for claiming an “idea.” Furthermore, the first clause of the sentence in the quote 
has no legal or logical relation to that determination—it is dictum—and yet Rubber-
Tip Pencil continues to be cited as standing for the proposition that there is a judicial 
exception to patent eligible subject matter.282 
The modern section 101 cases, beginning with Gottschalk v. Benson,283 are 
precedent in their own right, and the Supreme Court has been willing to craft section 
101 decisions within the constraints of these decisions.284  However, the Court 
appears unwilling to rely on Benson as a foundation for the exceptions and continues 
to claim that “these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of 
                                                                                                     
 274.  O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 119-20 (“[C]laim [eight] can derive no aid from the specification filed. It is 
outside of it, and the patentee claims beyond it. And if it stands, it must stand simply on the ground that 
the broad terms above-mentioned were a sufficient description, and entitled him to a patent in terms 
equally broad. In our judgment the act of Congress cannot be so construed.”). 
 275.  102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
 276.  Id. at 726 (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 117-18 (1853)). 
 277.  See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) 
(citing generally to pages 112-120 of O’Reilly v. Morse). 
 278.  See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the Court did not discuss ‘eligibility,’ but simply held that this 
claim was not limited to the ‘specific machinery’ described in the specification, and was unduly broad.”). 
 279.  Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 730 (1880) (“It is objected that the particular apparatus 
described in the patent for carrying the process into effect cannot be operated to produce any useful 
result.”). 
 280.  87 U.S. 498 (1874). 
 281.  Id. at 507. 
 282.  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 185 (1982); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 283.  409 U.S. at 63. 
 284.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) (“[T]his Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, 
and Diehr . . . show that petitioners’ claims are not patentable processes because they are attempts to 
patent abstract ideas.”). 
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statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”285 
Judicial exceptions are a paradoxical form of statutory interpretation—an 
otherwise unambiguous statute has become a feeding ground for judicially-created 
statutory exceptions otherwise unmentioned within the Patent Act.286  For reasons 
described above, the judicial exceptions to section 101 are based on dicta from cases 
that predate the 1952 Act and that sometimes stand for other propositions within 
patent law, but at no point does the Supreme Court point to any definitive case or 
decision explaining the source of, or the rationale for, these alleged judicial 
exceptions. 
4.  Supreme Court Involved In Policy 
Alice is the fourth section 101 case in as many years287 involving patents in 
litigation.  By comparison, in the preceding forty years, the Supreme Court heard 
only five section 101 cases, and all of those were appeals from ex parte denials of 
patent applications.288  While there is no standard or requirement for cases the Court 
can choose to accept, the Court’s increased involvement in section 101 litigation 
could be interpreted as policy action.  However, the divided decision below in the 
Federal Circuit also presents good reasons for the Court to intervene.  
As policy, Alice creates more problems than it fixes.  By failing to acknowledge 
the explicit changes in the 1952 Act, Alice turns the clock back sixty years.  
a.  Congress Has Already Acted On This Issue 
Alice is truly wrong-headed policy, because Congress has already acted on this 
very policy question when it sought to correct the number of overly broad patents by 
creating USPTO post-grant proceedings.289 
The district court granted CLS Bank summary judgment a week before the 
America Invents Act290 (AIA) was passed, so post-grant proceedings were not an 
option in this case.291  However, in future cases, PTAB post-grant proceedings 
remain an option and should be encouraged, because Congress created these 
adversarial proceedings in which third parties can challenge the validity of an issued 
patent.  When these proceedings result in a final written decision,292 estoppel attaches 
and the finding is binding on the parties.  The practical effect of a post-grant 
proceeding before the USPTO is to preclude the accused infringer from claiming, in 
                                                                                                     
 285.  Id. at 602. See also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 2354; Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
 286.  See, e.g., Diamond, 450 U.S. at 182-85. 
 287.  See supra Part II.A. 
 288.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 289.  See infra notes 292-295 and accompanying text. 
 290.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in various 
sections of 35 U.S.C. and other titles). 
 291.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 768 F.Supp.2d 221 (D.D.C. 2011). The district court decision was 
issued on March 9, 2011, and AIA was passed a week later on March 16, 2011. See Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in various sections of 35 U.S.C. and other 
titles). 
 292.  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2015). 
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district court, that the patent is invalid.  
The AIA post-grant proceedings consist of post-grant review (PGR),293 inter 
partes review (IPR),294 and the transitional program for covered business method 
patents (CBM),295 which operates under the PGR procedural umbrella. 
PGR is available in the first nine months after a patent issues, and challenging 
parties must act quickly to assemble a petition of no more than eighty pages that 
“demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged 
in the petition is unpatentable.”296  Alternatively, the petitioner may show “that the 
petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or 
patent applications.”297  The scope of PGR is broad and can include challenges under 
sections 101, 102, 103 and 112 of the Patent Act.298  Financial and business method 
patents can be reviewed at any time as a CBM proceeding under the PGR 
standards.299 
IPR petitions are limited to sixty pages in length, and the petitioner must 
demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood” of prevailing with respect to at least one of 
the claims challenged in the petition.300  Invalidity grounds are limited to novelty and 
nonobviousness in sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act. 
During a post-grant proceeding, parties are encouraged to settle, but an outcome 
becomes binding and estoppel attaches when the PTAB issues a “final written 
decision.”301  While it could be argued that Alice provides a very useful tool for these 
PTAB proceedings,302 Alice provides an alternative venue, district court, that may 
draw invalidity challenges away from the PTAB. 
b.  Separation of Powers 
One need not be a constitutional scholar to identify the separation of powers 
issue associated with the Supreme Court’s active involvement in crafting exceptions 
to an unambiguous statute when the Constitution specifically gives this authority to 
Congress.303  In relation to other sections of the Patent Act, the Court has been 
                                                                                                     
 293.  See 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012) (allowing third parties to challenge the validity of a patent filed after 
March 16, 2013 within nine months of patent issue under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 & 112). 
 294.  See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (enabling third parties to challenge pre-AIA patent validity, on 
novelty or obviousness grounds, from issue until twelve months from the filing of an infringement claim 
against the third party in district court; for post-AIA patents, the IPR window begins on the later of nine 
months from patent issue or the termination of a PGR proceeding). 
 295.  See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.300–304 (2015) (creating CBM as a PGR proceeding that applies to pre- 
and post-AIA patents related to a “financial product or service”; the CBM program is scheduled to sunset 
on September 15, 2020). 
 296.  35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012). 
 297.  35 U.S.C. § 324(b) (2012). 
 298.  See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012) (outlining the threshold standard for PGR implementation at 
patentability of at least one claim); 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (defining the scope of patentability 
challenges); Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty v. Int’l Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 661-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(interpreting the scope of patentability challenges under § 282). 
 299.  See supra note 295. 
 300.  See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). 
 301.  35 U.S.C. §§ 318(a), 328(a) (2012). 
 302.  See Sachs, supra note 32 (showing that PTAB “CBM” proceedings have a 100% patent 
invalidation rate under section 101). 
 303.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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unwilling to go beyond the statutory text and usurp Congressional authority.304  In 
light of separation of powers, policy appears to be the only explanation for the 
Court’s action in Alice.  Either way, it is poor policy that fails to recognize 
Congressional authority and fails to defer to existing legislation directed at this 
precise set of policy questions. 
5.  System, Product, And Method Claims Tied Together 
The final legal implication of Alice is that patents that claim a system 
implemented on a general purpose computer, a mobile device, the Internet, and other 
similar mediums will rely on the method claims for patent eligibility.  If the method 
claims fail, so do the system and product claims.305  While this is most likely not the 
end of system claims in a software patent, this further reduces the strength of a 
software patent and will focus invalidity challenges on the method, because the 
method is the weakest part.  As Alice demonstrated, an invalid method can topple 
related patents for machines and products.  Meanwhile, patent attorneys will most 
likely work to find ways to link system embodiments to specific computing 
platforms, though this will most likely hurt the innovation the patent system seeks to 
protect. 
6.  Alice Will Backfire 
As a policy tool, Alice provides an effective means through which the patent 
system can rid itself of overly broad patents that should not have been issued in the 
first place.  For example, even though the specification supporting Alice’s patents is 
long and details a great deal of engineering, the patent claims are significantly 
broader than the specification and are possibly too broad.306  At some level, it may 
have been “right” for the Court to invalidate Alice’s patents, but the path to this legal 
conclusion is fraught with difficulties.  First, the doctrine of “judicial exceptions” to 
a statute in the absence of textual ambiguity perpetuates judicial activism.307  Second, 
the Court’s subjective test for patent eligibility based upon “invention” misreads the 
1952 Act and the reasons for its passage.308  Third, patent eligibility for electrical or 
computer innovations becomes a matter of labeling in which the assertion that a 
patent claims an “abstract idea” appears to shift the burden onto the patent owner.309  
Finally, the Court provides no guidance as to the findings of fact necessary for lower 
courts to determine whether there is sufficient “inventive concept” in a given patent 
                                                                                                     
 304.  See supra note 39. 
 305.  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (citations omitted) (“Put another 
way, the system claims are no different from the method claims in substance.  The method claims recite 
the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic 
computer components configured to implement the same idea.  This Court has long warn[ed] . . .against 
interpreting § 101 in ways that make patent eligibility depend simply on the draftsman’s art.”). 
 306.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (filed May 28, 1993). 
 307.  See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 308.  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 309.  See discussion supra Part I.E.  This runs contrary to the rest of patent law where the party 
asserting patent invalidity as a defense carries the burden of proving invalidity, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012), 
by clear and convincing evidence, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
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claim.310 
Alice is a golem, and technology companies will be unable to stop it.  At some 
point, when Alice has been used to eliminate all the overly broad software and 
business method patents that many people agree should not have issued, that is the 
point when Alice will be used to invalidate so-called “good” patents.311  When that 
happens, the problem will be that the courts will be unable to stop Alice, and in light 
of the unanimous support of the Supreme Court, it is highly unlikely that the courts 
will see fit to overturn or limit Alice at any time in the near future.312  The true fix 
for Alice must come from Congress, and for that to happen, someone will need to 
advocate for a legislative solution to Alice.313 
III.  WHO WILL STAND UP FOR SOFTWARE? 
There are numerous legislative approaches through which to resolve the 
challenges presented by Alice.314  Unfortunately, it is not as easy as Judge Rader 
suggests, that we simply “consult the statute.”315  While the statute is instructive, too 
much has happened, and courts have decided on too many cases for us to turn the 
clock back to 1953 and pretend that all the modern section 101 cases have not been 
decided. 
A.  Software Patents Are A Policy Issue 
As discussed in Part II.C.4 supra, the question of whether software should be 
patented is a policy question.  This is one element of its decision in Benson that the 
Supreme Court got right.316  However, courts are poorly suited to create policy or to 
                                                                                                     
 310.  See David Bohrer, Guest Post: In Rush to Invalidate Patents at Pleadings Stage, Are Courts 
Coloring Outside the Lines?, PATENTLYO (Jul. 1, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/invalidate-
pleadings-coloring.html; see also Hidetada James Abe, Marsha E. Diedrich, Pretrial Dismissals and 
Judgments in Post- Alice Courts, ALSTON & BIRD (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.alston.com/ 
publications/pretrial-dismissals-and-judgements-in-post-alice-courts. 
 311.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,798,438 (filed Dec. 7, 2012). This patent, entitled “Automatic video 
generation for music playlists” is representative of software patents in general. Id. 
 312.  It would be possible to limit Alice by imposing burdens on the moving party., see Microsoft Corp. 
v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), or by acknowledging that Alice presents either a mixed question 
or a question of fact. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (holding that 
factual determinations in patent claim construction are reviewed for clear error and not de novo).  Such 
limitations might slow the impact of Alice in district court litigation, removing the section 101 patent 
eligibility determination from early to late pretrial, but this would have no effect on the granting of patents 
by the USPTO, where Alice could preclude patenting in large areas of technology. 
 313.  See David J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, The Great Patent Debate: Changing 
Horizons, Address at Intellectual Asset Management (IPBC/Global) Meeting the NPE Challenge (Mar. 
13, 2015), available at http://www.iam-media.com/files/Kappos%20speech.pdf (“Make no mistake: if 
America denies robust protection to software innovations, decreased investment will inevitably follow—
eroding a competitive advantage in a sector that has proven vital to the United States economy.  Again, to 
the benefit of overseas competitors who would like nothing better than an open ticket to copy US software 
innovation.”). 
 314.  See Sachs, supra note 31. 
 315.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F. 3d 1269, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, C.J., 
“additional reflections”). 
 316.  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) (footnote omitted) (“The technological 
problems tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by the Congress is 
needed.”). 
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write legislation, which is why Alice and the accompanying section 101 cases are so 
problematic.  Once the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are “judicial 
exceptions” to section 101, the Court ended up, unsuccessfully, in the business of 
harmonizing these unwritten exceptions into a single, cohesive rule.317 
B.  Why Technology Companies Will Need to Step Up 
There are five possible groups of “actors” that could lead the way to overturn 
Alice and to set the record straight on the underlying patent eligibility of software 
related technologies and the underlying process inventions.  These potential actors 
include: technology companies, Congress, the USPTO, the judiciary, and the general 
public. 
Of these, we can eliminate the general public, Congress, and the judiciary.  The 
public has neither love for, nor understanding of patent law, and in general, the public 
sentiment tends to sway against patents.318  Similarly, public sentiment against patent 
trolls appears to cross party lines, and Congress has taken numerous bi-partisan 
actions in recent years to address abusive litigation practices.  Thus, it is unlikely that 
Congress will—without prompting—initiate reform to overturn Alice and to 
strengthen protection for software patents.319  Given the unanimous voice with which 
the Supreme Court has spoken in recent section 101 cases,320 it is unlikely that the 
judiciary will act sua sponte to overturn Alice or to undo several decades of activism 
with respect to section 101.  On the other hand, the Federal Circuit could limit Alice 
by clarifying the burdens on moving parties and by articulating whether the Alice 
test is a factual or a mixed question.  However, these potential limitations would not 
address the impact of Alice on patent examination and the issuance of software 
patents by the USPTO.321 
This leaves two possible actors: the USPTO and technology companies.322  The 
USPTO will let technology companies take the lead in overturning Alice for two 
reasons.  First, as an administrative agency, the USPTO will have to live with the 
judiciary over the long run, so it is doubtful the USPTO will take the lead in 
overturning a Supreme Court decision.  Second, and more importantly, technology 
companies have gotten the patent system they asked for—this is a system that has 
prioritized throughput of patent examination over patent quality.323 As the USPTO 
                                                                                                     
 317.  See generally CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1269 (demonstrating a divided decision arising out of the 
confusion associated with working within a series of exceptions as opposed to statutory text). 
 318.  See supra note 26. 
 319.  See, e.g., H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 320.  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (9-0); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (9-0); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (9-0); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (9-0). 
 321.  See supra note 312. 
 322.  See supra note 43. 
 323.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (defining a due process balancing test for 
administrative processes). Patents are a property right entitled to due process protection and follow 
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480, 485 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In 
USPTO terms, the balance is between the number of patents issued and the quality of those patents. See 
Dominique Guellec, Catalina Martinez & M. Pluvia Zuniga, Pre-Emptive Patenting: Securing Market 
Exclusion and Freedom of Operation, OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY WORKING PAPERS  
(Dec. 30, 2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/218405082642 (finding that patent pre-emption and product 
258 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
will say to the technology industry: “you broke it, and it’s up to you to fix it.” 
Regardless of the reason for the shift to diversified software/hardware patent 
portfolios, the practical effect is that a large number of high technology companies 
have diversified their product portfolios and reduced their dependence solely on 
software patents.  For example, U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949324 is indicative of the type 
of patent protection that technology companies seek today, incorporating machine, 
article of manufacture, and process claims into a single invention. 
C.  Technology Companies Have Built This System 
The USPTO is an administrative agency that responds to the applications 
presented to it by inventors and technology companies.  In setting fees, the USPTO 
must balance between patent prosecution speed, the quality of issued patents, and the 
overall cost of obtaining a patent.  Technology companies have significant input into 
how the USPTO and patent offices around the world function. 
Figure 4: Top 10 Companies Patenting Software In The United States, 2013325 
Of the companies patenting software and software-related technologies as found in 
Figure 4, the top ten include companies that sell a diversified mix of both hardware 
and software.  IBM is the largest patentee by far, with 4,746 software and software-
related patents issued in 2013 alone.326  Numbers two and three in the list are 
Microsoft and Google, and both companies have ventured into hardware businesses.  
                                                                                                     
clearance/freedom-to-operate objectives pressure technology companies to prioritize patent quantity over 
quality). 
 324.  See supra note 102. 
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Microsoft acquired Nokia’s mobile device business in 2014, and Google divested 
Motorola Mobility after purchasing the company in 2012.327 
The primary challenge for companies that rely solely on software and distributed 
computing services is that the high-technology business model has shifted from one 
that rewards companies that sell software, as was considered to be the innovation of 
the 1980s and 1990s,328 to one in which leading companies—such as Apple, 
Samsung, Microsoft, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and so forth—earn their profits by 
selling a combination of hardware and software.329  At this time, it is unclear whether 
this shift in business model is a result of gaps in the underlying patent protection 
available for software or if it is simply a broader business trend. 
Economic analyses by the OECD suggest that technology companies have 
gotten the patent system they asked for, because the priorities for product clearance, 
also known as “freedom to operate,” and pre-emption tend to focus patent resources 
across a larger number of patents, often compromising patent quality.330  The large 
numbers of patents owned by large technology companies in software and other 
industries reflects a focus on numbers of patents over quality and diversification of 
technologies.331 
With a risk that a large number of software-related patents are now worthless 
after Alice, technology companies must decide whether to continue to invest in 
software patent protection, to abandon their patenting efforts, or to lobby for 
legislation to overturn Alice. 
D.  Alternative Points of View 
There are several different points of view on software patenting that would 
suggest an altogether different approach following Alice.  The voices against 
software patenting would do nothing and let software patents fall to the wayside.  
                                                                                                     
 327.  See Peter Burrows and Dina Bass, Google’s Moto Sale Casts Doubts on Microsoft’s Nokia Plan, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Jan. 30, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-
30/google-s-moto-sale-casts-doubts-on-microsoft-s-nokia-plan. 
 328.  See Nathan Myhrvold, Invention: The Next Software, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES (Mar. 7, 2006), 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/assets_docs/Invention_Next_Software_Transcript_2006_Speech.p
df (“In 1987, as a representative of Microsoft, I went to a conference . . . . Now, we had a proposition and 
the proposition was not only can you make software valuable without hardware; software was actually a 
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broadly speaking, we were right. I don’t just mean Microsoft; I mean the software industry was right.”). 
 329.  See Steven A. Ballmer, Shareholder Letter, MICROSOFT 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (Sep. 27, 2013), 
https://www.microsoft.com/investor/reports/ar13/shareholder-letter/index.html (“Last year in my letter to 
you I declared a fundamental shift in our business to a devices and services company. . . . Our strategy: 
High-value activities enabled by a family of devices and services.”). 
 330.  See supra note 323. 
 331.  See, e.g., A37 Top PCT Applicants, 2013, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS, 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/wipi/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (identifying the top 20 Patent 
Cooperation Treaty applicants in 2013). The number of large technology companies helps to put things 
into perspective—technology companies compete in many markets, and patents are a necessary part of 
their business, especially because the average technology company spends approximately 10% and 12% 
of revenues on research & development. See Michael Casey & Robert Hackett, The 10 Biggest R&D 
Spenders Worldwide, FORTUNE, (Nov. 17, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/17/top-10-
research-development. 
260 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
The issue is not as clear as the anti-software patent/anti-patent community would 
make it appear. 
1.  Are Software Patents Worthless? 
Some have suggested that software patents are of categorically low quality and 
are not worth very much.332  Judge Mayer has spoken to this idea.333  However, 
“studies of invalidation rates have consistently demonstrated that software patents 
are not statistically prone to being ‘bad’ patents.”334 
There are two factors at play in public sentiment about software patents.  First, 
the average person is more apt to take notice of software patenting and software 
patent litigation, because it impacts technologies that people interact with on a daily 
basis.  For example, litigation over the date-picker feature in Microsoft Outlook335 is 
something that many people would understand.  The same is true of recent litigation 
over patents related to podcasting technologies.336 
Second, when a layperson reads a single patent, he or she has very little context 
to understand that patent within the context of thousands of other patents and 
inventions.  Each individual patent looks like a specious attack on some prized 
innovation.337  Of course, out of context, just about any legal document—for 
example, a severability clause in a contract—would be confusing to a layperson.  The 
difference with software patents is that people think they understand technology, and 
they are disappointed to find an incomprehensible jumble of words surrounded in 
statutory and legal complexity and bundled together into a patent publication.  
2.  Alice Levels The Playing Field 
If software is not patentable, and if all technology companies face the challenges 
presented by Alice, then all companies should be on a level playing field.  However, 
this statement fails to factor in the differences between companies, the geographies 
in which they operate, and the markets in which they sell.  An open source software 
company such as Red Hat is opposed to software patents because the underlying 
business model of open source focuses patenting on narrow areas and in smaller 
numbers than other software businesses.338  Yet, a company like IBM might have an 
altogether different business objective in a given market.  These differences mean 
that Alice will impact technology companies in different ways. 
Furthermore, patents are territorial rights, and companies in international 
markets must address protections in those markets anyway, so U.S. patenting is just 
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part of their business.  On the other hand, some jurisdictions, such as countries within 
the European Union, do not support software patenting, though international treaties 
leave the door open.339 
3.  Patent Laws Are Unclear 
The argument that patent laws are unclear is specious, because the Supreme 
Court takes no issue with the statutory interpretation of section 101.340  However, 
even if Congress were to accept public sentiment against patent trolls and software 
patents and decide to exclude software from patenting, the solution itself would be 
problematic.  Without amending the Constitution, it would be difficult to exclude 
some technologies from patenting while including others, and as articulated supra, 
software is such a critical part of so many innovations today that it would be nearly 
impossible to exclude software patents without also eliminating patent protection for 
just about any technology that involves computing or electronics.  Furthermore, 
software patents are only part of section 101 jurisprudence, and as recent cases such 
as Mayo and Myriad have shown, the Court is equally suspect about patenting 
medical treatments and biotechnology.341  Companies working in these other areas 
of technology will be natural allies when the high-technology industry approaches 
Congress to amend the Patent Act to overcome Alice. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Section 101 of the Patent Act allows inventors to seek patents for processes, 
machines, products, and compositions of matter.  However, the Supreme Court has 
decided that section 101 contains three judicial exceptions and that abstract ideas, 
natural phenomena, and laws of nature cannot be patented.  Software has become an 
important part of the global economy, and software patents have been challenged as 
being “abstract ideas” and therefore excepted from patent-eligible subject matter.  
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has explained that section 101 does not prevent the 
patenting of software but that the judicial exceptions do apply, and the Court has 
upheld the invalidity of software patents that the Court has determined to claim an 
“abstract idea.” The case law explaining these “judicial exceptions” has been 
difficult to implement as either a rule or a test.  
In Alice, the Court articulated a two-step test for evaluating whether a software 
patent claims an “abstract idea” and how to identify whether there is an “inventive 
concept” sufficient to overcome the judicial exception and to make the subject matter 
                                                                                                     
 339.  See TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Art. 27, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal Texts: 
The Results Of The Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (defining patentable subject matter). 
 340.  See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1982) (“Industrial processes such as this are the 
types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.”). In general, it is 
worth noting that the Supreme Court has not taken issue with section 101, id. at 181-84, and the source of 
the Court’s interference in patent eligibility is premised entirely on the existence of the so-called “judicial 
exceptions,” id. at 185. 
 341.  See supra note 339, at 331 (The TRIPS agreement Article 27(3)(a) allows member nations to 
exclude from patentability “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals”). 
262 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
of the invention eligible for patenting. 
This Comment has argued that the judicial exceptions to section 101 are 
paradoxical jurisprudence with no basis in legal fact until 1972, when the Court 
decided Benson and applied the “abstract ideas” exception.  While Benson could be 
understood as the Court’s failure to identify the transformative impact of the 
computing industry, the Court’s steadfast adherence to Benson and related modern 
section 101 jurisprudence is beyond comprehension in today’s economy.342  
Furthermore, for issued patents that contain what a court identifies as subject matter 
identified by the judicial exceptions, the Alice test reintroduces a test for invention—
the inquiry into “inventive concept”—that Congress specifically overturned in the 
1952 Act.  Until Alice, the patent eligibility of software innovations was uncertain, 
but after Alice, the two-step test has been widely used to invalidate more than a 
hundred patents in Article III courts.  Also, in less than a year, Alice has been used 
to invalidate thousands of patent applications in process before the USPTO, and as 
one commenter observed, “the dead [patents] keep piling up.”343 
Alice is such a drastic decision that it is beyond judicial remedy at this point, and 
even if a lower court, such as the Federal Circuit, were to limit Alice to require 
findings of fact, Alice would continue to direct patent examination policy before the 
USPTO, which will continue to prevent patenting of a large number of software 
innovations.  For this reason, technology companies will need to lobby Congress for 
a legislative solution that overturns Alice and clarifies the patent eligibility for one 
of the biggest innovation sectors in our economy. 
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